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I.

INTRODUCTION

THE Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 ("Fees
Act" I deals solely with the awarding of attorney's fees. The Fees
Act was enacted to encourage private enforcement of the civil rights
laws by filling the "anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws created by
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Aeska.'' 2 The
Supreme Court held in Ayeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Socz'ety

that absent specific legislative authorization, courts were to apply the
traditional rule prohibiting the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 4 The Fees Act is the legislative response which enables
powerless minorities5 and the poor 6 to purchase legal representation
t Assistant Professor of Law, Lehman College, City University of New York.
B.S., Cornell University 1964; J.D., Columbia University 1967.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). The Fees Act reads in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.
1681 et seq.], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. Section
2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Id
2. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedbi 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5908, 5911-12 (referring to Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240 (1975)).
The complete legislative history of the Fees Act, including related documents,
has been consolidated. See SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES

AWARDS ACT OF 1976---SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as SOURCE BOOK].

3. 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (superseded by Fees Act).
4. Id at 269.
5. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976). The Fees Act applies in large part to racial discrimination cases brought under the Reconstruction-

(597)
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in civil rights cases which often yield little monetary recovery, but
which are of great personal and societal importance. 7
The Fees Act and many other federal statutes8 authorize feeshifting as a method of promoting private enforcement of publicly
beneficial statutory policies.9 In so doing they contravene the standard American rule requiring each side in civil litigation to bear its
own attorney's fees. 10 Although these statutes are numerous, their efera Civil Rights Acts. See Lipson, Beyond A/yeska-Judicia/ Response to the Civil Rights

Attorneys' Fees Act, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J., 243, 245-46 (1978). For a discussion of the
laws covered by the Fees Act and the cases to which it could apply, see generally 1d;
H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra.

6. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 5, at 1. In defining the purpose of the Fees
Act, the House Report stated: "Because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights
violations cannot afford legal counsel, they are unable to present their cases to the
courts." Id. SeealsoS. REP. No. 1011, supra note 2, at 2, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5910.
7. See 122 CONG. REC. 33,314 (1976) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Senator
Kennedy remarked that there are
often important principles to be gained in [civil rights] litigation, and rights
to be conferred or enforced, but just as often no large promise of monetary
recovery lies at the end of the tunnel. So civil rights cases-unlike tort or
antitrust cases-do not provide the prevailing plaintiff with a large recovery from which he can pay his lawyer.
Id

8. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274, 3276 (1983) ("[there are]
more than 150 existing federal fee-shifting provisions"). The extent of success required for an award of fees varies greatly under these statutes, as does the amount of
court discretion in specific cases. Standards include: "prevailing party," "substantially prevailing party," "successful party," and "whenever [the court] determines
that such an award is appropriate." Id at 3276-77 & nn.3-5. "Appropriate" in this
last standard must now be read to require at least some success on the merits. Id
Some statutes mandate attorneys' fees awards to successful parties. See, e.g.,
Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). For a more extensive list of mandatory fees
award statutes, see Note, Prevaiing Defendant Fees Awards in Civil Rights Litigation." A
Growing Threat to Private Enforcement, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 75, 90 n.78 (1982). However,

the majority of these statutes give the courts discretion in awarding attorney's fees.
See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B) (1982); Berger, Court Awarded
Attorneys'Fees." What is "Reasonable":, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 304 (1977).
The number of compilations of federal fee-shifting statutes is fast approaching
the number of statutes. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240, 260 n.33 (1975); SOURCE BOOK,supra note 2,at 303; E. LARSON, FEDERAL
COURT AWARDS OF ATrORNEY'S FEES 323-27 (1981); Berger, supra, at 303 n.104;
Note, supra, at 90 n.80.
9. See, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 718 (1974) (desegregation class
action in which "plaintiffs.

.

.rendered substantial service

. . .

to the community at

large by securing for it the benefits [of] . ..a nondiscriminatory educational system."); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13 (1973) (" 'Not to award counsel fees in cases
[involving reinstatement of union members following expulsion for criticism of management] would be tantamount to repealing the [Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure] Act itself by frustrating its basic purpose.' " (quoting Cole v. Hall, 462
F.2d 777, 780 (2d Cir. 1972), aft, 412 U.S. 1 (1973))); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (class actions enjoining racial discrimination in cafeterias "vindicat[e] a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority").
10. For a compact history of the American rule, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
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fectiveness relies upon continual judicial appreciation of the ameliorative and utilitarian purposes intended by their creator.I'
Ever growing inroads are being made into the initial successes of
civil rights attorneys in gaining Fees Act awards. 2 One of the most
serious and significant of these is the increasing practice of defense
counsel, especially those who represent public entities, of conditioning
favorable offers to settle the merits of Fees Act cases on the acceptance
13
of full or partial waivers of attorneys' fees by plaintiffs' lawyers.
This waiver aggravates the inherent tension in a non-fee-generating
civil rights case between the low income plaintiff, whose primary interest is in success on the merits, and his attorney, whose economic
aim is to obtain an award of counsel fees. It accordingly provokes a
potential conflict of interest between attorney and client, caused by
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-57 (1975) (superseded by Fees Act); Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litgation,48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 311-17 (1973).
The American rule has been criticized in part because of its failure to fully redress injuries and to deter injurious conduct. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of
Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's
Fees. Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REV. 75 (1963); Rowe, The Legal Theoy
of Attorney Fee Shiing." A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651.
11. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 2, at 2, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5910. Referring to Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000e (1982), and the Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1975, 42
U.S.C. § 19731 (1982), the report notes that "these civil rights laws depend heavily
upon private enforcement, and fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private
citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain." Id For further discussion of the necessity
of fee awards to the effective redress of civil rights violations, see notes 5-7 and accompanying text supra, and notes 35-39 and accompanying text infra.
12. It has been estimated that public interest attorneys were awarded more than
one million dollars in fee awards within a few months after the Fees Act became
effective. Derfner, One Giant Step. The Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Awards Act of /976, 21
ST. Louis U.L.J. 441, 441 (1977).
Of course success has never come close to the predictions of opponents who characterized it as an "attorney relief" statute. 122 CONG. REC. 31,850 (1976) (remarks
of Sen. Allen).
13. See Winter, Fee Waiver Requests Unethical: Bar Opinion, 68 A.B.A. J. 23 (1982).
The author notes that E. Richard Larson, national staff counsel for the American
Civil Liberties Union, has "estimated that there are requests for fee waivers in more
than half of the civil rights cases litigated." Id
The exact number of requests is difficult to determine. They occur at the settlement stage of civil rights cases, and therefore almost never appear in reported decisions. Also, along with other civil cases in the federal district courts, almost all civil
rights cases are settled before trial. For instance, during the twelve month period
before June 30, 1982, only 14.6% of the civil rights cases were terminated during or
after trial. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES COURTS 242-43 (1982). Finally, most civil rights cases are class
actions and, while not statistically documented, it is a fact that class actions rarely go
to trial. See Dam, Class Actions: Eftiiency, Compensation, Deterrence,and Conict ofInterest,
4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 59-60 (1975).
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the attorney's duty of loyalty to the client and self-interest in gaining
an award of fees; this invariably results in the attorney's capitulation
in the fee waiver demand and recommendation of the beneficial settlement of the merits.' 4 However, in spite of the recognition of this
inherent ethical dilemma by courts,' 5 commentators,1 6 and those conducting studies of attorney's fees, 17 the problem has received only cursory discussion. 18
This article examines the practice of simultaneous negotiation of
the merits and attorney's fees in the settlement of Fees Act cases and
the ethical constraints which this practice places on attorney participants. It also analyzes the impact of this practice on enforcement of
the civil rights laws, its conflict with the public policy of the Fees Act,
and possible judicial remedies which could obviate the practice.
II.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976
A.

Filling the Gap Left by Alyeska

The broad public policy of the Fees Act must be read through
the remedial lens of a consistent and clear pattern of judicial and
congressional support and encouragement of civil rights cases. 19
Blurred for a time by Ayeska, 20 the tripartite exception the federal
courts had developed to the American rule barring fee-shifting was
restored in the Fees Act by reuniting the private attorney general theory of fee-shifting with the two judicially created exceptions: the
21
common fund doctrine and the bad faith rule.
Originally approved by the Supreme Court in 1881, the common
14. Largely to provide variety, I will use the terms, "conditional fee settlement,"
"conditional fee waiver," "fee waiver settlement," "lump-sum settlement," and "simultaneous settlement" interchangeably. They all connote the practice of negotiating and conditioning settlement of the merits of Fees Act cases on the full or partial
waiver of attorney's fees by prevailing plaintiffs.
15. For a discussion of judicial recognition of this inherent dilemma, see notes
60-107 and accompanying text infra.
16. See, e.g., LARSON, supra note 8, at 66-68; Dam, supra note 13, at 56-61; Levin,
Practical,Ethical and Legal Considerations Involved in the Settlement of Cases in Which Statutory Attorney's Fees Are Authortzed, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 515, 515-19 (1980); Note,
Awards Act, 80 CoLUM.
Promotingthe Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorne 's F
L. REV. 346, 361-62 (1980); Note, Timeliness of Post-Judgment Motionsfor Attorneys Fees
Under the Cwil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 355, 395-97 (1982).
17. A. MILLER, ATTORNEYS' FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS 219-20 (1980).
18. For a discussion of the superficial treatment of this conflict of interest, see
notes 108-11 and accompanying text infra.
19. For a discussion of the judicial and congressional encouragement of civil
rights litigation through fee awards, see Derfner, supra note 12, at 441-45.
20. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (super-

seded by Fees Act).
21. For the history of exceptions to the American rule such as the common fund
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fund concept enables courts to award fees to successful plaintiffs who
recover or preserve a common fund for themselves or others 22 or confer a common benefit upon a class. 23 The value of the common fund
exception is that it spreads the costs of litigation among the beneficiaries. 24 In contrast, the bad faith exception 25 focuses on the behavior of a party who conducts all or part of an action in bad faith, 26 or
in a vexatious, wanton or oppressive manner. 27 Attorney's fees are
doctrine, bad faith rule and private attorney general theory, see notes 22-32 and
accompanying text mtiqa. See also Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 314-17.
The Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska had "foreclosed the shifting of attorney's fees under the private attorney general theory in federal litigation." Note, supra
note 8, at 88. The Fees Act was a direct and immediate response by Congress to
Alyeska. See Derfner, supra note 12, at 446. The Act, by restoring the private attorney
general theory of fee shifting, filled the "anomalous gaps" created by the court's decision. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 2 at 4, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs at 5911; Note, supra note 8, at 83-89.
22. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). The Supreme Court held
that it would be unfair for a plaintiff bondholder, who succeeded in rescuing a trust
fund for a group of bondholders, to shoulder the entire legal expense. The Court
concluded that he should have his legal expenses reimbursed from the fund or from a
proportional contribution from those bondholders who benefited from his legal success. Id at 532.
See also Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (plaintiff's right to
place lien on accounts of bank in receivership vindicates "beneficiaries similarly situated but not actually before the court, as well as the interest of the common creditors"). The Court in Sprague also noted that the "formalities of the litigation" (i.e.,
whether or not the plaintiff sued as representative of a certified class) were irrelevant
to the interest "of equity in doing justice." Id at 167. See generall Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258 (1975) (superseded by Fees Act)
(citing Supreme Court decisions recognizing the common fund doctrine); Dawson,
Lawyers andInvoluntary Clients. Attorney Fees From Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974)

(tracing the development of the common fund doctrine).
23. This aspect of the exception applies the common fund concept to success in
obtaining nonmonetary benefits. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) (vindication
of expelled union member's right of free speech "dispels the 'chill' casts upon rights"
of other union members); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (stockholder's action concerning misleading proxy statement benefited "all shareholders by
providing means of enforcement of the proxy statute").
24. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396-97 (1970) (fees award
does not "saddle the unsuccessful party with the expenses but ... impose[s] them on
the class that has benefited from them and that would have had to pay them had it
brought the suit").
25. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
258-59 (1975) (superseded by Fees Act) (citing Supreme Court cases recognizing a
bad faith exception).
26. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962) (defendant "willful[ly] and persistent[ly]" refused to investigate libellant's claim though damages
were "plainly owed him under laws that are centuries old"); Bell v. School Bd., 321
F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963) (defendant's "discreditable" tactics included a long standing
refusal to initiate desegregation and repeated creation of administrative obstacles to
desegregation plans); Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 6 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934)
(stockholder action filed without any legal or factual basis).
27. See, e.g., Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 441 F.2d 631,
637 (5th Cir.) (accusation made fraudulently and without any basis), cert. denied, 404
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awarded to punish the wrongdoer, as well as to provide restitution for
the cost of defending against an action brought or prosecuted in bad
faith.

28

Alyeska brought a hiatus in the application of the judicially created private attorney general theory which had allowed federal courts
to award attorney's fees to plaintiffs whose successful civil rights cases
resulted in benefit to the public. 29 Despite its holding that the Ameri-

can rule controlled absent a specific federal statutory exception allowing fee-shifting, the Supreme Court left the bad faith and
common fund exceptions intact, 30 and invited Congress to create a
provision for attorney's fees in civil rights cases. 3 1 Less than one and
U.S. 941 (1971); Gates v. Collier, 70 F.R.D. 341, 345-46 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (defense
purposefully delayed proceedings for sake of delay and denied well documented
facts), aff'dinpart, rev'dinpart,559 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1977); Red School House, Inc. v.
O.E.O., 386 F. Supp. 1177, 1186-87 (D. Minn. 1974) (defendant acted contrary to
clear statutory and regulatory directives).
28. The attorney's fees are assessed as part of the fine, in order to punish the
defendant, or to reimburse the plaintiff for costs incurred because of the improper
behavior. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) ("the underlying rationale of 'fee
shifting' [in cases involving bad faith] is, of course, punitive"); Toledo Scale Co. v.
Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923) (defendant liable for attorney's
fees incurred by successful plaintiff in defendant's subsequent attempt to enjoin enforcement of earlier decree); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 704 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's prosecution of suit without a colorable claim and in bad faith warrants fee
award to defendants). For a discussion of the availability of attorney's fees awards
under the Fees Act to prevailing defendants able to prove bad faith on part of plaintiffs, see note 45 and accompanying text infra.
29. The Supreme Court conveniently provided a list of the cases it was overruling. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 270 n.46 (1975)
(superseded by Fees Act).
For extensive discussions of the private attorney general doctrine prior to Alyeska,
see Derfner, supra note 12, at 443-45; Note, Private Attorney GeneralFees Emergefrom the
Wilderness, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 258, 261-72 (1974); Note, Awardng Attorneys' Fees to
the "PriateAttorney General" Judicial Green Light to Pri'vate Litigation in the Public Interest,

24

HASTiNGS

L.J. 733 (1973).

30. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 259. Referring to the common fund and bad faith
doctrines, the Court acknowledged that "[t]hese exceptions are unquestionably assertions of inherent power in the courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular situations,
unless forbidden by Congress." Id See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472,
478 (1980) ("The common-fund doctrine . . .stands as a well-recognized exception
to the general principle that requires every litigant to bear his own attorney's fees."
(citing Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 259-58)).
31. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 262-64. The Court recognized that "Congress has
opted to rely heavily on private enforcement to implement public policy and to allow
counsel fees so as to encourage private litigation" with many of the fee award statutes. Id at 263. However, it cautioned, the use of the private attorney general theory
in statutes did not authorize judicial abandonment of the American rule in the absence of congressional authority. Id Finally, the Court concluded that "Congress
. . .presumably has the power and judgment" to decide which statutes merited fees
awards, but that "it would be difficult, indeed, for the courts, without legislative
guidance, to consider some statutes important and others unimportant and to allow
attorney's fees only in connection with the former." Id at 263-64.
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one-half years later, Congress cordially and decisively accepted the
3 2

invitation.

B.

Legzslalite History and CongressionalIntent

The legislative history of the Fees Act clearly manifests Congress'
recognition that civil rights laws are heavily dependent upon private
enforcement; 33 that suits by the general public are an essential and
operative means of enforcement; that awards of attorney's fees provide necessary incentives to stimulate such private enforcement; and
that awards of attorney's fees deter potential violators of the civil
34
rights laws.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary emphatically noted that
the viability of the civil rights laws depends on private enforcement
through litigation, stating that "[tihe purpose and effect of [the Fees
Act] are simple-it is designed to allow courts to provide the familiar
remedy of reasonable counsel fees to prevailing parties in suits to enforce the civil rights acts. . . . All of these civil rights laws depend
heavily upon private enforcement. . . . "35 The legislative history is
replete with findings that, without attorney's fees awards, violations
would go unredressed because most citizens lack the financial resources to bring civil rights claims. 36 The Senate Committee on the
32. Alyeska was decided on May 12, 1975. 421 U.S. 240. The Fees Act was
passed by the Senate on September 29, 1976, 122 CONG. REC. 33,315; by the House
of Representatives on October 1, 1976, 122 CONG. REC. 35,130; and signed by the
President on October 19, 1976, 122 CONG. REC. 35,086-87.
33. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 2, at 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5908. Since the Supreme Court in Ayeska barred fee awards under the
private attorney general theory absent specific statutory authorization, Congress was
concerned that the lack of uniform provisions in the various civil rights acts would
create inconsistent civil rights enforcement. See id. at 4-5, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5911-12; H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 5, at 1.
34. For a discussion of these propositions, see notes 35-39 and accompanying
text infra.
35. S. REP. No. 10 11, supra note 2, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5909-10. See also H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 5 at 1 ("the effective
enforcement of the Federal civil rights statutes depends largely on the efforts of private citizens").
36. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 5, at 1; S. Rep. No. 1011, supra note 2, at
2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5910. In its discussion of the
Fees Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee warned:
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must
sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If
private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights . . . then citizens
must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these
rights in court.
Id. Both the Senate and House reports quoted approvingly from the Supreme
Court's decision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968): "If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorney's fees, few aggrieved
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Judiciary stated this succinctly: "If the cost of private enforcement
actions becomes too great, there will be no private enforcement. If
our civil rights laws are not to become mere hollow pronouncements
which the average citizen cannot enforce, we must maintain the tra'37
ditionally effective remedy of fee shifting in these cases."
The legislative history of the Fees Act also stressed that the close
nexus between attorney's fees awards and enforcement of the civil
rights laws, which existed on the level of individual remedy, was just
as essential for the maintenance of our national civil rights effort. 38
Moreover, it is evident that Congress saw the threat of Fees Act
39
awards as a deterrent to noncompliance with the civil rights laws.
Finally, Congress was convinced not only that its post-A/ eska resurrection of the private attorney general concept would stimulate effective, consistent enforcement of the civil rights laws, but also that it
would have the additional benefit of "limiting the growth of the [civil
' 40
rights] enforcement bureaucracy.
C. Judicial Apph'cation of Congressional Intent
Provided with such an ample and extensive legislative record,
the courts predictably responded to the Fees Act with liberal conparties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts." Newman, 390 U.S. at 402, quoted in S. REP. No.
1011, supra note 2, at 3, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 5910; also
quoted in H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 5, at 6.
37. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 2, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD.NEWS at 5913.
38. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 5, at 9. The House Judiciary Committee
concluded: "The effect of [the Fees Act] will be to promote the enforcement of the
Federal civil rights acts, as Congress intended, and to achieve uniformity in those
statutes and justice for all citizens." Id In short, by encouraging the use of the
private attorney general theory, the Fees Act has an impact upon judicial enforcement of civil rights far beyond redressing the rights of the individual litigant who
brings the action. For a discussion of the public benefits of the private attorney general theory, see notes 5-7, 29 & 35 and accompanying text supra.
39. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 2, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 5910. The Senate Judiciary Committee recognized that "if those
who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then
citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these
rights in court." Id. "[F]ee awards are essential if the Federal statutes to which [the
Fees Act] applies are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards
are ancillary and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee
awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance." Id
at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 5913.
40. Id at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 5911. By creating the economic incentive of fee awards for prevailing parties, the Fees Act has reduced the need for a civil rights enforcement bureaucracy by encouraging the growth
of a private civil rights bar with "its own built-in financial viability." Derfner, supra
note 12, at 451.
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structions of its legislative history and expansive readings of its broad
remedial purposes. 4' Congress had made this easier by specifically
anticipating many issues that quickly arose in Fees Act cases. For
example, the Fees Act was ruled applicable to pending cases. 42 Congress' dual "prevailing party" standard was also endorsed. 43 Under
this dual standard, prevailing plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to
fees under the general standards announced in pre-Fees Act cases,
many of which were expressly endorsed by Congress in the legislative
history. 44 On the other hand, fees can be awarded to prevailing defendants "only if the action [of the plaintiff] is vexatious and frivolous, or if the plaintiff has instituted it solely 'to harass or embarrass'
the defendant. '45 Additionally, Fees Act awards were made available
41. For a discussion of the legislative call for this liberal interpretation and the
appropriate judicial response, see notes 51-52 and accompanying text infra.
42. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 694 n.23 (1978). The Supreme Court
quoted the plain language of the House Judiciary Committee: "In accordance with
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, the bill is intended to apply to all cases
pending on the date of enactment.
... Id (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra
note 5, at 4 n.6 (citing Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974) (absent contrary
statutory direction on legislative history, "a court is to apply the law in effect at the
time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice"))).
43. See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (prevailing defendants may
recover fees only where plaintiffs action is "groundless or without foundation");
Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 487 (3d Cir. 1978) (prevailing plaintiff may recover
fees where he has "essentially succeeded" on his claim). For a further discussion of
the dual prevailing party standard, see notes 44-45 and accompanying text infra.
44. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (successful
plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee award unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust"), quoted with approval in S. REP. No. 1011,
supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5912; also quoted
with approval in H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 5, at 6. See, e.g., New York Gaslight
Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) (Title VII authorized prevailing plaintiff fee award
absent special circumstances); Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759
(9th Cir.) (successful challenge to school assembly prayer entitles parent to Fees Act
award), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981); Chicano Police Officers' Ass'n v. Stover, 624
F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980) (successful employment discrimination challenge leading to
consent judgment entitles plaintiff to Fees Act award). See also Note, supra note 8, at
94.
45. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 5, at 7 (quoting United States Steel Corp. v.
United States, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975)). Concerned that fee awards for prevailing defendants would discourage the enforcement of civil rights through private litigation, " 'the courts have developed a different standard for awarding fees to
prevailing defendants because they do not appear before the court cloaked in a mantle of public interest.' " Id at 6 (quoting United States Steel Corp. v. United States,
519 F.2d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 1975)). See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (prevailing defendant entitled to fees award where "plaintiff's
action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation" regardless of existence of
bad faith); Gage v. Wexler, 82 F.R.D. 717 (N.D. Cal. 1979)(defendant was awarded
portion of fees where tenant-plaintiffs action was groundless and litigated in bad
faith); Kane v. City of New York, 468 F.Supp. 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)(defendant
awarded portion of fees where plaintiffs 12th suit, despite three full hearings and
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pendente i e, 4 6

and to plaintiffs who succeed through out-of-court set48
tlements 4 7 or by consent decree.
But not surprisingly, even after extensive hearings, Congress
failed to divine some problems which soon surfaced. Two of these are
the question of whether pro se litigants are eligible for Fees Act
awards, 49 and the availability of awards to plaintiffs who prevail in
cases rendered moot (usually by some intentional action of defend-

subsequent dismissals, reflected harassment and bad faith), af 'dmem., 614 F.2d 1288
(2d Cir. 1979). See also Note, supra note 16, at 353-54.
46. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 2, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5912; H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 5, at 8 (citing with approval
Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 723 (1974) ("to delay a fee award until the
entire litigation is concluded would work substantial hardship on plaintiffs and their
counsel, and discourage the institution of actions despite the clear congressional intent to the contrary . . .")). See, e.g., Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845 (9th Cir.
1980)(authorizing Fees Act award for preliminary injunction though case mooted
before full argument), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981); Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 574 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978) (preliminary injunction granted as part of
final appealable order merits Fees Act award).
47. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 5, at 7. Recognizing that there is more
than one way to win a law suit, the House emphasized that "It]he phrase 'prevailing
party' is not intended to be limited to the victor only after entry of a final judgment
following a full trial on the merits..... A 'prevailing' party should not be penalized
for seeking an out-of-court settlement, thus helping to lessen docket congestion." Id.
See, e.g., Young v. Kenley, 614 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1979).
48. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 2, at 5, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5912; H.R. Rep. No. 1558, supra note 5, at 7 ("If the litigation terminates by consent decree, for example, it would be proper to award counsel fees"). See,
e.g., Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980) (Fees Act award to plaintiff obtaining
consent decree amending welfare regulations); Iranian Students Ass'n v. Edwards,
604 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1979) (Fees Act award to student group obtaining consent
decree amending university demonstration rules).
49. See Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to Prevailtig Pro Se Litigants, 80 MIcH. L.
REV. 1110, 1117 (1982) ("the committee reports and congressional debates Ion four
of the acts, including the Fees Act, which authorize fee awards] . . . do not mention
pro se parties"). Pro se litigants are more likely to be awarded fees under the various
fee-shifting statutes if they are attorneys. See Note, Pro Se Can You Sue?: Attorney Fees
for Pro Se Litigants, 34 STAN. L. REV. 659, 666 (1982). See, e.g., Ellis v. Cassidy, 625
F.2d 227, (9th Cir. 1980) (Fees Act award to pro se attorney-defendant where plaintiff's action brought in bad faith); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(1982), fee award to
plaintiff-attorney). But see White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 388
(4th Cir.) (prospect of fee generation and absence of detached and objective perspective warrant denial of plaintiff-attorney's fee award request under Truth-in-Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3)(1982)), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980). Non-lawyers are
much less successful. See Barret v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (5th
Cir. 1981) (fees award to non-attorney pro se litigant, pursuant to Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(B)(1982), inconsistent with encouraging potential litigants to
consult with attorneys), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); Crooker v. United States
Dept. of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980) (non-attorney plaintiff who does
not divert time from income-producing activity to bring action not entitled to fees
award under Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(1982)); Davis v.
Parratt, 608 F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir. 1979) (Fees Act award presupposes attorneyclient relationship which is absent with non-attorney pro se litigant).
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ants) and dismissed before trial. 50 A third is the subject of this article:
the conflicts of interest and detrimental impact on the goals of the
Fees Act caused by the simultaneous negotiation of the merits and
Fees Act attorney's fees awards.
"In the civil rights area, Congress has instructed the courts to use
the broadest and most effective remedies available to achieve the
goals of our civil rights laws." 51 At least four federal courts of appeal
have already followed this admonition in concluding that the Fees
Act must be liberally construed to achieve its sweeping remedial purposes. 52 In filling a gap in congressional intent, the court should predict what Congress would have done if it had foreseen the specific
problem by "starting from the areas where the legislative intent is
readily discernible, and projecting to fair and reasonable corollaries
'53
of that intent for the specific issue in question.
There is a direct clash between the Fees Act's remedial purpose
50. See Note, Civil Rights Attomey's Fees Awards in Moot Cases, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
809, 825 (1982) ("[ajlthough Congress did not mention moot cases, it explicitly authorized fees awards in many other situations falling short of a full trial on the merits"). The courts have sometimes considered the question of mootness under the
prevailing party rubric of the Fees Act. See, e.g., Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 848
(9th Cir. 1980) ("[cllaims for attorneys' fees . . . may be heard even though the underlying case has become moot"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981). But see Cramer v.
Virginia Commw. Univ., 486 F. Supp. 187, 192 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1980) ("plaintiff cannot be a prevailing party where his claim is dismissed as moot"). Courts often look to
see whether the plaintiff is the catalyst behind the defendant's voluntary compliance.
See, e.g., Dayan v. Board of Regents, 620 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980) ("plaintiffs obtained substantial voluntary relief as a direct result of their lawsuit" and thus were entitled to a fees award) (emphasis supplied by the court)).
51. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 5910.
52. See Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824, 829 (3d Cir.) ("Congress has noted that the
primary goal of the [Fees] Act is 'to promote the enforcement of the Federal Civil
Rights Acts, as Congress intended, and to achieve uniformity in those statutes and
justice for all citizens.' . . . [T]he [Fees] Act must be liberally construed to achieve
these ends." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 5, at 19)), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
300 (1982); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Congress' purpose in authorizing [Fees Act] awards was to encourage compliance with and enforcement of the civil rights laws. The Fees Awards Act must be liberally construed to
achieve these ends."); Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G & U Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 37
(2d Cir. 1978) ("In view of this clear congressional mandate we cannot accept that
the statute must be construed narrowly as the district court held. Rather, [the Fees
Act] must be applied broadly to achieve its remedial purpose."); Seals v. Quarterly
County Court, 562 F.2d 390, 393 (6th Cir. 1977) (The Fees Act "should be liberally
construed to achieve the public purposes involved in the congressional enactment.").
53. Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 445 F.2d 739, 746 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1013 (1971). See also Portland Cement
Assoc. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 380 (D.C. Cir.), ("[i]n statutory interpretation,
the courts must often, in effect, consider what answer the legislature would have
made as to a problem that was neither discussed nor contemplated"), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 921 (1973).
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of encouraging compliance with our national civil rights laws through
the process of private enforcement, motivated by the mechanism of
attorney's fees awards, and the disincentive to private enforcement
which results from the simultaneous negotiation of the merits and
waivers of attorney's fees. 54 On balance, the remedial policies underlying the Fees Act are certainly comprehensive enough to require that
this gap in Fees Act legislative history be filled with a public policy
55
barring conditional fee waivers.
Indeed, these same remedial policies were found substantial
enough to render void certain provisions of a privately negotiated annual funding contract between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
and Community Legal Services (CLS), by which the local legal services organization agreed to waive its right to seek attorney's fees in
actions against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 56 In Shads v.
Beal,57 the Third Circuit, citing repeatedly to the Fees Act's legislative
history, found a clear public policy of encouraging private enforcement of civil rights laws. 58 Against this background, the court held
that defendants, especially public officials, could not buy immunity
from Fees Act awards through the means of a private agreement.
In this case, we conclude that the Commonwealth has attempted to vitiate, by contract, a significant portion of the
power and duty which Congress has granted to the judiciary
as an essential tool in the scheme of civil rights enforcement.
It is axiomatic to our federal system that neither private
parties nor the states can avoid the equitable powers of the
federal courts. . . . Here, the existence of a contrary private agreement cannot successfully be asserted as a defense
to the district court's statutorily mandated supervisory
59
power over attorneys' fees.
54. For a discussion of the negative impact of fee waivers on the civil rights bar
and civil rights practice, see notes 168-91 and accompanying text znfra.
55. For a discussion of the clear legislative intent supporting a broad remedial
purpose for the Fees Act, see notes 33-40 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the liberal construction which several courts have given the Act in order to
effect that purpose, see note 52 and accompanying text supra.
56. Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir.), cert. demed, 103 S. Ct. 300 (1982).
Although it was argued that the contract was voidable on grounds of economic duress, the Third Circuit specifically declined to decide the case on that basis. Instead it
predicated its decision on the public policy of the Fees Act. Id at 828 n.6.
57. 685 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 300 (1982).
58. Id at 829-30 (citing S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 2, at 2, 5-6, reprenledin 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5910, 5913; H.R. R.P. No. 1558, supra note 5, at

9).
59. Id. at 831 (citation omitted). The court continued: "Congress expressed
unambiguously the significance it attached to the attorneys' fees provisions, and we
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There is a striking parallel between the coercive nature of the
bargain in Shadis and that in conditional fee waivers. Unlike a fee
waiver agreement made during the settlement of a single lawsuit, the
Shadis agreement involved a yearly funding contract; however, both
capitalize on the conflict between attorney and client as their source
of coercive power. 6° In Shadis, CLS acceded to the waiver provisions,
under protest, only because its obligations to poor clients were
threatened by the severe fiscal crisis brought about by imminent
defunding. 6 1 Similarly, simultaneous settlement pits attorney against
poor client in a setting in which the best interest of the client mandates acquiescence and waiver of the right to petition for a Fees Act
award. Buying Fees Act immunity on a case-by-case basis is just as
antagonistic to federal civil rights enforcement policies as purchasing
62

it annually.
Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U, Inc.63 is another case

which demonstrates the breadth of the public policy encompassed by
the Fees Act. By successfully suing to gain a first amendment right of
access for its attorneys to visit farm workers living in labor camps
located on privately owned farms, Mid-Hudson Legal Services was
64
held to be a prevailing plaintiff and eligible for a Fees Act award.
Although farm workers were not party plaintiffs, 65 the legal services
program was entitled to attorney's fees because it had vindicated the
conclude that the public policy embodied in [the Fees Act] is a vital one." Id.Accordingly, the court ruled the contract between the commonwealth and CLS to be
"void as contrary to public policy." Id.at 833-34 (citing
OF CONTRACTS §§

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

178, 179 (1979)).

60. 685 F.2d at 831. The trial court had directly drawn the analogy:
Like any private lawyer, CLS must remain within a budget, and only do
the legal work that it can afford to do. . . . The obvious effect ofthis [contractj,
ifthe agreement is enforced, is to cause CLS not to bring actions against the Commonwealth. In end result, an important member of the plaintiffs' civil rights bar
would be removed from the scene, and the vigorous enforcement of the laws
would be materially quelled.
Id. (quoting Shadis v. Beal, 520 F. Supp. 858, 864 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (emphasis added
and footnotes and citations omitted by court of appeals)).
61. 685 F.2d at 828 & n.6.
62. For a discussion of the argument that the American Bar Association Code of
Professional Responsibility requires acquiescence to a fee waiver in exchange for a
favorable settlement on the merits (whereas CLS attorneys have no particular ethical
duty to continue the program's operations), and thereby imposes a larger hurdle to
fulfillment of Congressional intent, see notes 150-53 and accompanying text infra.
63. 578 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1978).
64. Id at 36-38.
65. Mid-Hudson Legal Services asserted that its own first amendment rights
were violated in that it was not free to speak to or associate with workers, even
though it was statutorily mandated to provide such free services. Id at 35 (citing
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 105(e), 81 Stat. 672, 709
(repealed 1978)).
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federal policy in favor of increasing farm worker access to legal services and therefore qualified under the Fees Act's "clear congressional
mandate" that those who act as private attorneys general are entitled
66
to reasonable attorney's fees.

Mid-Hudson Legal Services has two important messages for conditional fee settlements. First, the public policy of the Fees Act must be
read expansively to accomplish its goals. 67 This requires that courts
look beyond the immediate parties in civil rights cases to the benefit
conferred upon those who are not actual participants in the lawsuit. 68
Second, if this flow of benefit to third persons furthers the Fees Act
policy of opening avenues to the legal system in civil rights cases, then
69
it is a proper basis for an award of attorney's fees.
In conditional fee settlement cases, the absent third party is the
class of persons the Fees Act was designed to protect. Unless attorney's fees awards are made to the prevailing plaintiffs in settlements
on the merits, future civil rights grievants will find their access to legal counsel stifled.
III.

JUDICIAL RESPONSE

To

THE PROBLEM OF SIMULTANEOUS

SETTLEMENT

A.

The Prandini Decision

A number of courts have considered the ethical issues surrounding the conflicts of interest inherent in simultaneous negotiation of
the merits and attorney's fees. Of the courts that have recognized the
strain and tension it creates between attorney and client, only the
66. Id at 37.
67. Id.
For a discussion of other circuit court rulings which also call for a liberal
construction of the Fees Act, see note 52 and accompanying text supra.
68. 578 F.2d at 37. The court reasoned that, although the farm workers were
not parties to the litigation, "Mid-Hudson was not engaged in a simple academic
exercise to vindicate the constitutional rights of its attorneys. The sole purpose of the
litigation was to gain access to the workers at their place of abode in order to disseminate information and to provide legal assistance and counsel." Id at 36.
69. Id.at 37. The court drew the link between the interests of Mid-Hudson and
those of the farmers based on the policy of the Fees Act:
In view of the intimate nexus between the action here commended by MidHudson to establish its right to communicate with the farm workers employed by G & U, and the exercise by the workers of their rights, we cannot
agree that appellants were not acting to vindicate a general federal policy
which [the Fees Act] was designed to promote.
... . Thus, an award of legal fees in the discretion of the district
court was within both the letter and spirit of [the Fees Act].
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Third Circuit Court of Appeals has emphatically acted to remedy this
practice.
In the leading case directly addressing this issue, Prandini'v.Nazonal Tea Co.,70 the Third Circuit concluded that negotiations of statutorily authorized attorney's fees should commence only after
settlement of the merits has been completed. 71 Defending a sex discrimination in employment class action, National Tea proposed a settlement which contained a fund for class relief and a separate fund of
up to $50,000 to pay court-approved attorneys' fees. 72 Sharing the
district court's concern about a possible "conflict of interest," the
Third Circuit held that this contemporaneous settlement procedure
results in the "potential for impropriety [which] gives rise to possible
misunderstanding by the public."' 73 The genesis of this potential misperception is the division of a settlement offer in a class action between the attorneys and the class, which can take one of two forms.
First, the defendant may offer a lump sum award, leaving it to the
counsel and class to make the division. In this setting, the conflict of
interest between the two is clear.7 4 Second, the defendant may agree
to a fund for the class and a separate fund for counsel. While the
potential for conflict appears minimal in this situation, there remains
the spector of a "generous" defendant buying off the representative or
actual class member(s) and counsel at the expense of the passive class
members.

75

70. 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977).
71. Id. at 1021.
72. Id at 1017. The action was brought by a class of female employees pursuant
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). The attorney's fees
award was authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
73. 557 F.2d at 1017. Seeing this potential perception of impropriety, the court
felt obliged to act in order to fulfill what it perceived to be its "duty to see to it that
the administration of justice has the appearance of propriety as well as being so in
fact." Id.at 1021.
74. Id at 1020. Under this "common fund" approach, the fees award will reflect a direct reduction in the client's recovery. Id Professor Miller has found that
there is rarely any opposition to the attorney's fee petition in these cases, a result he
found "disturbing" because "most of the procedures for determining fees are based
on an adversary model. . . ." A. MILLER, supra note 17, at 212. Such an "ex parte"
proceeding creates "a risk that the class interest is slighted .. " Id.
75. Prandini,557 F.2d at 1020-21 (citing Prandini v. National Tea Co., 16 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 956 (W.D. Pa. 1976)). The district court noted that "[t]he
defendant deals with the representative party or parties and counsel who also represents the class. The impulse to treat opposing counsel and the representative party
generously is an element that cannot be ignored." 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
957.
Professor Miller recognized that this potential conflict is even greater where
there are no active class members:
a class attorney may be tempted to accept a smaller class recovery in return
for agreement on a handsome attorney's fee. .

.

. When a large attorneys'
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The Prandi scenario fit within the latter category, and by protecting the interests of the passive class members, the court found itself essentially deciding an ex parte appeal.7 6 Moreover, the court was
not unmindful of the need to encourage out of court dispute settlements.7 7 Concerned with the potential attorney-client conflict of interest on the one hand, and the havoc which would be wrought by
prohibiting settlements where statutory fee awards were involved on
the other, the court mandated a bifurcated procedure in which the
merits of the case (including damages) were settled before any attorney's fees negotiations were begun.7 8 Such an alternative, the court
concluded, "would eliminate the situation found in this case of having, in practical effect, one fund divided between the attorney and
79
client."
fee means a smaller class recovery, a substantial conflict of interest between
the class and the attorney is created. Even if the plaintiffs attorney does
not consciously bargain for a higher fee at the expense of the class, it is
difficult to estimate the effect this situation has on the negotiations and in
any event a damaging appearance of conflict of interest exists.
A. MILLER, supra note 17, at 219-20.
76. Pradin', 557 F.2d at 1021. The Third Circuit explained the difficult position
it was in by quoting approvingly the analogy drawn by the district judge:
[A]s devil's advocate, we must look at an agreement by defendants to pay
counsel for the class a fee up to a certain maximum, as determined by the
court, as having the potentiality of what is known in the labor field as a
"sweetheart contract." This puts the judge who must determine its reasonableness and fairness in the posture of a "bad guy." None of the class members [complain]; counsel for the defendant does not complain; why should
he interject himself into the arrangement?
Id (quoting Prandini v. National Tea Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 957).
77. 557 F.2d at 1021 ("we recognize that with the increasingly heavy burden
upon the courts, settlements of disputes must be encouraged").
78. Id
79. Id.A recent survey shows that over 51% of the judges and 65% of the attorneys responding "agreed" or "strongly agreed" with this resolution of the potential
conflict of interest. A. MILLER, supra note 17 at 224. For a further discussion of this
study, see notes 221-23 and accompanying text infra.
Critics argue that this two step process is not the panacea it may seem to be.
First, it may be difficult to enforce the mandated separation, for attorneys may enter
"informal agreements on fees, or formalize agreements but withhold them until the
merits are settled. A. MILLER, supra note 17, at 222 & n.39. Second, by "eliminating
the very certainty that makes settlement attractive to the defendant," the Prandhin
approach may discourage settlements. Id.at 222-23. Professor Miller suggests allowing attorneys to estimate the likely fee request, so as to allow defendants to anticipate their own costs. Id at 223. While this may appear very similar to an informal
agreement, Professor Miller concludes that "at some point reliance must be put on
the integrity of the attorneys." Id For a further discussion of potential difficulties
that might arise in applying the Drandini two-part process, and responses to those
concerns, see notes 192-224 and accompanying text infra.
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B.

Other Cases Recognizing the Ethical Conflict

The Prandinisolution has not gone unnoticed by other courts. In
Mendoza v. United States,8 0 a school desegration class action, the Ninth
Circuit refused to set aside a settlement reached through the concurrent negotiation of the merits and $500,000 in attorneys' fees for class
counsel.8 1 The court acknowledged that joint negotiation necessarily
creates an ethical conflict 82 and, citing Prandzni, went on to "strongly
discourage the simultaneous negotiation of attorneys' fees and sub"83 Still, in
stantive issues in class action settlement negotiations ....
upholding the $500,000 attorneys' fees settlement, the court continued, "we do not believe rejection of a resulting settlement in every
8' 4
case is appropriate.
The ambivalent approach of the Ninth Circuit in Mendoza was
echoed by the Seventh Circuit in McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee
Corp.,8 5 a class action suit by railroad bond and debenture holders
which was settled, in part, by an agreement to pay $250,000 in damages to a subclass. 86 This settlement was attacked as a sham, created
to provide a fund for payment of attorney's fees, and as a means for
defendants to buy their way out of the lawsuit. 87 The Seventh Circuit
showed the uncertainty characteristic of most courts considering contemporaneous negotiation. The court noted that it was not uncom80. 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
81. Id at 1353.
82. Id at 1352. The Ninth Circuit recognized that, even though plaintiff's allegations of conflict of interest were "no more than suggestive of mere potential
conflicts,"
[w]e cannot indiscriminately assume, without more, that the amount of
fees have no influence on the ultimate settlement obtained for the class
when, along with the substantive remedy issues, it is an active element of
negotiation. Nor do we believe that this potential conflict disappears simply because there is no fund or money damages being negotiated. Financial
consequences of injunctive relief are a significant consideration to the institution negotiating a remedy, and the potential conflict between class counsel and the members of the class remains.
Id at 1352-53 (citing Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977))
(footnotes omitted).
83. Id. at 1353.
84. Id. Quoting Prandini, the Ninth Circuit noted that although there was no
evidence of impropriety in the case, it is the appearance of impropriety against which
the court must guard. Id & n.20. Commenting that the active participation of the
United States Department of Justice was "a significant factor in quieting the potential for unfair treatment of minority interests," the court concluded that the appearance of impropriety was neutralized. Id at 1353. For a further discussion of the
Mendoza approach, see notes 116-19 and accompanying text infra.
85. 565 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1977).
86. Id. at 423.
87. Id. The court acknowledged "that there [was] no dispute but that [counsel]
will seek $125,000 out of the $250,000 fund." Id. at 424.
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mon for settlement agreements to include attorney's fees.8 8 It also
expressly deferred passing judgment on the Prandini analysis8 9 because, unlike Prandhn, the factual setting of the case insured an adversary posture during the fee award proceedings. 90 Instead, the Seventh
Circuit left to the district judge, in resolving the pending fee claims
which remained in the action, the "opportunity to consider the applicability of the Prandiniguidelines." 9 1
Undoubtedly, the most notable appreciation of the ethical dilemma raised by simultaneous negotiation in a Fees Act setting has
occurred in Regalado v. Johnson.92 In Regalado, the Eastern District of
Illinois first applied contract law principles to decide that a consent
93
order in favor of the class was silent on the matter of attorney's fees.
It then agreed to consider a Fees Act motion made on behalf of the
88. Id at 423. On this point, the court referred extensively to the Manual for
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46 (rev.
ed. 1982)). The Manual is explicit in its disapproval of a settlement proposal which
does not include attorney's fees: "Such an arrangement should not be permitted. All
amounts to be paid by the defendant(s) are properly part of the settlement fund and
should be known and disclosed at the time the fairness of the settlement is considered." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46, at 65 (rev. ed. 1982) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
The reasoning behind such inclusion is that it avoids "the making of collateral
private, undisclosed agreements for payment of attorneys as a feature of a class action
settlement." Id. However, when there is this simultaneous negotiation of fees and the
award, the same authority recognizes that "there is an inherent conflict of interest."
Id. at 66.
89. 565 F.2d at 426 (citing Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir.
1977)).
90. Id at 425. The court recognized that the Prandinifee proceeding was essentially an "ex parte application[ ]" Id (citing Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d
1015 (3d Cir. 1977)). In the case before it, on the other hand, the Seventh Circuit
had the benefit of the district court's "interesting solution" of giving one of the defendants a reversionary interest in any part of the settlement award left unclaimed.
Id. Consequently, adversariness was insured because the defendant "retain[ed] an
economic incentive to contest [counsel]'s fee request, by virtue of the opportunity to
regain a portion of the account on deposit." Id
91. Id at 426. In referring the pending fee claims to the district court, the Seventh Circuit noted that the judge "may confront . . . problems relating to ex parte
applications" because the remaining fee requests pertained to cases in which the "interesting solution" of the reversionary interest was not invoked. Id at 425. Declining
to accept the Prandiniprocedure until the district court had considered the circumstances, the court concluded that "the district judge will have an initial opportunity
to consider the applicability of the Prandziguidelines." Id at 426 (citing Prandini v.
National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977)).
92. 79 F.R.D. 447 (E.D. Ill. 1978) (class action by unemployment insurance recipients, seeking injunctive relief to prohibit unreasonable delays in replacement of
benefit checks which were mailed but never received).
93. Id at 450-51. After recognizing that "[o]ne of the indispensable characteristics of a contract is mutual assent, manifested by one party to the other," the court
ruled that a "consent order, being like a contract, cannot be so interpreted that a
party to it is deprived of a right . . . to which there has been no agreement." (citations omitted). Since there was no agreement "that plaintiffs could not at least move

Complex Litigation. See id (citing MANUAL
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plaintiffs' legal services attorneys.9 4 The court's rationale in agreeing
to consider the fees request reflected two interrelated concerns. First,
recognizing that any plaintiffs motion for a fees award in cases involving indigent plaintiffs is a matter of concern only to the attorney,
the court stressed the ethical questions of discussing the fees in the
settlement stage. 95 Second, the court reaffirmed the strong public
policy in favor of Fees Act awards in order to effectively enforce the
96
nation's civil rights laws.
Other courts have not been as willing to intervene to resolve the
ethical conflicts of interests emanating from combined settlements.
The trend in these courts has been to acknowledge the ethical conflict, but to cherish the ability of adversaries to resolve it in the settlement process. For example, in White v. New Hampshire Department of
Employment Securt'y,9 7 the Supreme Court accepted the district court's
finding that a consent decree's silence on the matter of attorney's fees
did not constitute an implied waiver of the claim for fees, especially
since the facts demonstrated that prejudgment attempts to negotiate
a waiver of costs and attorneys' fees had failed. 98 The Court reversed
a unanimous First Circuit and held that a Fees Act motion for attorneys' fees was timely. Although it was made approximately four and
one-half months after approval of a consent decree and entry of judgment, because it dealt with a collateral matter and consequently was
not a "motion to alter or amend the judgment." The Court held that
this court for an award of attorney's fees and costs[,]" the court denied defendants
motion to strike the motion for fees. Id.at 451-52.
94. Id. at 452. Legal services organizations, although publicly funded, have
consistently been held eligible for Fees Act awards. Id at 451. For a discussion of the
rationale supporting fees awards to salaried legal services attorneys, see notes 179-87
and accompanying text infra.
95. 79 F.R.D. at 451. After recounting the nature of plaintiffs proceedings, the
court stated: "Everyone familiar with civil rights litigation knows that a plaintiff in
such suits rarely pays attorney's fees or the costs of litigation. For these reasons, a
motion for fees and costs in such a case, although made in the name of the plaintiff, is
really one by the attorney." Id.Accordingly, the court concluded, counsel's economic interest "makes it improper for the lawyer in a civil rights suit to inject the
question of attorney's fees into the balance of settlement discussions." Id (citing
Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977)).
96. The court realized that the purpose of the Fees Act was to compensate counsel for prevailing parties in civil rights litigation. Moreover, the court continued,
"courts have been admonished not to lose sight of the fact that the overriding purpose of [the Fees] Act is encouragement of the private enforcement of civil rights laws
in order to fully vindicate the federal constitutional guarantees involved." Id.(citation omitted).
97. 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
98. Id at 448 & n.4. The Court did not review this finding because it was not
appealed; the precise issue was not the availability of a fee award, but the timeliness
of counsel's petition. See id.at 448-50.
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the motion was not subject to the ten day limit of Rule 59(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 99 The Fees Act award of attorneys'
fees was ruled to be collateral to the main cause of action because fees
could not be determined until a "prevailing party" existed, and this
determination required "an inquiry separate from [and necessarily
subsequent to] the decision on the merits." 100
In a footnote to his majority opinion, Justice Powell specifically
declined to rely on the ethical conflict of interest argument that had
proven attractive to the Eighth Circuit when it had considered the
same issue under review in While. 0 The Eighth Circuit had cited
Prandiniand Mendoza in ruling that the Rule 59(a) limit should not
apply because its short ten-day duration would compel abbreviated
simultaneous negotiations of the merits and attorneys' fees, and
thereby necessarily exacerbate the inherent ethical conflict of interest
between attorney and client. 10 2 In contrast to the Eighth Circuit,
Justice Powell explicitly recognized the existence of the conflict of in99. Id.at 451-52 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) ("A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment")). The
First Circuit had held that, although the Fees Act labels fees awards as "costs," they
were not "costs" within the meaning of Rules 54(d) or 58. Id at 448-49 (citing Fees
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d), 58). The First Circuit based its
holding on its conclusion that the costs assessable under those rules were all "capable
of routine computation," while a fees award request required a more in-depth and
adversary proceeding. Id at 449 (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl.
Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 702 (1st Cir. 1980)).
100. 455 U.S. at 451-52. The Court also reasoned that the relief sought in a fees
award motion was "not compensation for the injury giving rise to an action" and,
consequently, was "uniquely separable from the cause of action to be proved at
trial." Id at 452 (citation omitted).
The Court was not oblivious to the potential unfairness of fee award motions led
long after disputes had been settled. It noted that such problems could be ameliorated by invoking the district court's discretion to deny or award fees, or by establishing local rules governing fee award petitions. Id at 454 & n. 16 (citing Obin v.
District No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d 574
(8th Cir. 1981)).
101. 455 U.S. at 453 n.15. See Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d 574, 582-83 ("counsel would be placed in
the position of negotiating a fee ultimately destined for his pocket at the same time
that all thoughts ought to be singlemindedly focused on the client's interests") (citing
Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977); Regalado v.
Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447 (E. D. Ill.
1978)).
102. Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d 574, 582-83, (8th Cir. 1981) (citing Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d
1338 (9th Cir. 1980); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977);
Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447 (E.D. Ill.
1978)). The Eighth Circuit reasoned
that the ethical conflict would necessarily arise because "application of the ten-day
rule set forth in Rule 59(a) would require counsel during settlement negotiations to
discuss simultaneously the substantive issues in the action and the amount of the fee
award." Id at 582 (emphasis added).
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terest, 0 3 but pointed out that the Court chose instead to rely on the
integrity of the bar: "Although such situations may raise difficult ethical issues for a plaintiffs attorney, we are reluctant to hold that no
resolution is ever available to ethical counsel. ' 10 4 While the Supreme
Court may have raised the ethical issues in White only because the
First Circuit had considered them in its ruling,10 5 the California
Supreme Court has since wasted little time in elevating the Supreme
10 6
Court's dictum to the "view of the While court.
103. 455 U.S. at 453 n.15. Speaking for the Court, Justice Powell wrote: "Although sensitive to the concern [of conflict of interest] that petitioner raises, we decline to rely on this proffered basis. In considering whether to enter a negotiated
settlement, a defendant may have good reason to demand to know his total liability
from both damages and fees." Id.
It remains to be seen whether this footnote will pass into oblivion with thousands
of other Supreme Court footnotes, or whether Justice Powell will appear prescient.
To illustrate the difficulty of prediction, see the discussion of the (in)famous footnote
11 of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) in R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE
705-06 (1976). This footnote noted that sociological research had disproven the view
that the sense of inferiority among blacks arising from segregation was self-imposed, a
view first expressed in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). It was "destined to
become one of the most debated [footnotes] in the annals of the Court." Id. at 705.
Yet Chief Justice Warren included the footnote only to support the decision, not as
the substance: he was later quoted as saying: "[I1t was only a note, after all." Id. at
706.
Given Justice Powell's demonstrated antagonism towards the expansion of fee
awards, footnote 15 in White is likely to reappear. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103
S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (1983) ("where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the
results obtained"); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 23 (1979) (expanding scope of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) to include any statutory right) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("No one
can predict the extent to which litigation arising from today's decision will harass
state and local officials; nor can one foresee the number of new filings in our already
overburdened courts. But no one can doubt that these consequences will be substantial."), modified, Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Haldeman, 451 U.S. 1, 28
(1981) (§ 1983 does not apply where statute violated contains exclusive remedy).
104. 455 U.S. at 454 n.15.
105. See White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl. Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 705 (1st
Cir. 1980). The First Circuit did not "see anything wrong with requiring the parties
to face up to the issue of fees in their settlement negotiations." Id (comparing
Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447 (E.D. Ill. 1978)). After noting that "[f]ailure to
confront the fees issue merely muddies the waters," the court equivocated:
We of course do not suggest that an attorney in the course of settlement
negotiations need, or in every case properly may, hold out, against his client's best interests, for a specific fees award to be included in the consent
decree. If agreement as to fees is not easily accomplished, the parties may
provide for submission of the entire question of fees to the court; further,
they may, of course, decide to waive fees altogether.
Id

106. Folsom v. Butte County Ass'n of Gov'ts, 32 Cal. 3d 668, 681, 652 P.2d 437,
446, 186 Cal. Rptr. 589, 598 (1982) ("While the preferred procedure is to reserve fee
issues for judical consideration and determination . .. , we decline to rule, as plaintiffs urge, that fee matters may never be injected into negotiations on the merits without placing counsel in a position of inherent conflict. We thus join th[e] view of the
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C. Impact of the Court Decisions
Many of the courts confronting this ethical issue have continued
to exhibit a cavalier attitude towards the analysis set out in Prandzl
Thus, the courts' recognition of the inherent ethical conflict of interest' 0 7 is often followed by perfunctory approval, 0 8 adoption, 0 9 recommendation," 0 or rejection"' of the Prandhzi requirement that
settlement of the merits occur before any consideration of attorney's
fees. Rather than providing firm guidance, these decisions have left a
2
legacy of ambiguity to lower courts." 1
Where Court.
...(citing White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl. Sec., 455 U.S.
445 (1982)).
107. Many courts have recognized this ethical conflict. See, e.g., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1213 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982); Kincade v.
General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 503 n.l (5th Cir. 1981); Aho v. Clark, 608
F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1979); Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1315 (4th Cir.
1978); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1216 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 150 (3d Cir.
1978); Lisa F. v. Snider, 561 F. Supp. 724, 726 (N.D. Ind. 1983); Bacon v. Toia, 493
F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 648 F.2d 801, 810 (2d Cir.
1981), affdsub nom. Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982); Munoz v. Arizona State
Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670, 671-72 (D. Ariz. 1978); Lyon v. Arizona, 80 F.R.D. 665, 669
(D. Ariz. 1978); Dunn v. H. K. Porter Co., 78 F.R.D. 41, 43 (E.D. Pa. 1977), vacated,
602 F.2d 1105 (3d Cir. 1979); Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479, 484
(E.D. Pa. 1975). For further examples of cases confronting these ethical issues, see
notes 64-96 and accompanying text supra.
108. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In approving the settlement of a civil rights class
action, the court praised the separate negotiation of a settlement on the merits and
the agreement on attorneys' fees, recognizing that in this manner the parties avoided
potential conflict between plaintiffs and their counsel and also avoided the "delay
and turmoil" inherent in litigating the attorneys' fee issue more fully before the court.
See also Williams v. Ryan, 78 F.R.D. 364 (S.D. Ga. 1978). In evaluating a consent
decree in a racial discrimination class action, the court noted, approvingly, that attorney's fees played no part in the settlement since they were not provided for in the
settlement of the merits and were reserved for future court determination. Id.at 369.
109. See, e.g., Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 451 (E.D. 11. 1978) (It is
"improper for the lawyer in a civil rights suit to inject the question of attorney's fees
into the balance of settlement discussions."). For a further discussion of Regalado, see
notes 92-96 and accompanying text supra.
110. See, e.g., Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l. Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d 574, 582 n.10 (8th Cir. 1981) ("it is unrealistic to expect the
parties 'to waive fees altogether,' and it is preferable to avoid any appearance of
impropriety even if an agreement on fees may be 'easily accomplished' "); Mendoza
v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1353 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981)
("while we strongly discourage the simultaneous negotiation of attorneys' fees and
substantive issues in class action settlement negotiations, . . . we do not believe rejection of a resulting settlement in every case is appropriate").
111. See, e.g., Aho v. Clark, 608 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1979); Folsom v. Butte
County Ass'n of Gov'ts, 32 Cal. 3d 668, 681, 652 P.2d 437, 446, 186 Cal. Rptr. 589,
598 (1982).
112. Some decisions do recommend use of separate settlements. See note 101
supra. However, other decisions are premised on narrow readings of settlement agreements, which makes it difficult to determine the effect of their silence on the matter of
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For example, in Aho v. Clark,"1 3 a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief to require implementation of state-wide school breakfast
program, the Ninth Circuit approved a consent decree that was silent
on the question of attorneys' fees because it found that the parties had
intended it to be an "amicable settlement."' 4 The court concluded
that it would be "manifestly unfair" to the State of Hawaii to approve a subsequent Fees Act request that would alter the parties' original compromise." 5 Yet, shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit
implicitly reversed itself in Mendoza." 6 Without even mentioning
Aho,the court "strongly discourage[d]" the use of the same contemporaneous settlement process it had previously endorsed in Aho. 1' In
support of this new stance, the Mendoza court cited Prandin I"8 However, Mendoza's qualified endorsement of Prandi does not provide
attorneys' fees. See notes 85-91 supra. Such "recommendations" provide little guidance to lower courts.
113. 608 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1979).
114. Id at 367.
115. Id In determining whether the plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees,
the court applied the rule that "civil rights plaintiffs 'should ordinarily recover an
attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.' " Id
(citations omitted). The court then considered the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the parties' original settlement agreement, which did not contain a provision for counsel fees, to determine whether they should be granted. Id. The court
first noted that the Fees Act became effective only slightly more than two months
before the settlement was reached and inferred, therefore, that much of the negotiations did not concern this issue. Id Second, the court found that the parties may
have thought the law inapplicable. Third, the court accepted the defendants' argument that they would not have agreed to the settlement had they known the plaintiffs would seek attorneys' fees. Id The court emphasized this third point stating, "It
isevident that [plaintiffs], in order to realize the most important aims of the suit
without incurring the expense and risk of further litigation, agreed to forego some of
the benefits which they had originally sought." Id The court then found that the
statutory purpose of the Act did not mandate an award. Id at 367-68. In light of
these factors, the court finally concluded that "special circumstances" did exist and
affirmed the district court's refusal to disturb the parties' original compromise settlement. Id
116. See Mendoza, 623 F.2d at 1352-53. For further discussion of Mendoza, see
note 110 supra and notes 117-19 and accompanying text infra.
117. Mendoza, 623 F.2d at 1353. Ironically, the Ninth Circuit disapproved of
Mendoza's ample $500,000 negotiated attorney's fees settlement which was under attack by a subclass member, rather than the Aho fee waiver which had been challenged by the attorneys who were caught in the ethical dilemma. In addition, it is
surprising that Mendoza did not even mention Aho, since Judge Joseph Sneed sat on
both Ninth Circuit panels. After Mendoza, undoubtedly Aho must be limited to its
factual circumstances, since the case was filed four months before the Fees Act became effective, and the consent decree was approved two months after it became
effective. The Aho court ruled that the defendants may have relied upon an understanding that the law did not authorize attorneys' fees in such cases. See Aho, 608
F.2d at 367.
118. Mendoza, 623 F.2d at 1352-53.
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either courts or counsel with any clear guidance.'' 9 District courts,
with their discretion only slightly narrowed, are free to continue their
case-by-case supervision of simultaneous settlements; defense counsel,
tempted to gamble with demands for fee waivers, are merely faced
with lower odds for success.
D.

Barriers to Appellate Review

Part of the reason that the courts have been reluctant to embrace
the Prandhi method, and have instead adopted the tactic of giving
notice to lower courts and members of the bar to be cautious in simultaneous settlement situations, is that the most blatant examples of
conditional Fees Act waivers almost never reach appellate courts.
This is largely due to the tremendous leverage available to defendants
in fee waiver settlements. Indeed, this leverage not only survives a
negotiated settlement in the trial court, but gains strength after the
initial settlement and assures retaliation by defendants at every subse-

120
quent step in the review process.
Once the conditional pact is offered and accepted, there is little

plaintiffs' counsel have been able to do to test the validity of fee waiv-

ers. Motions in district courts to sever attorneys' fees from negotiations on the merits, made while settlement negotiations were
underway, have been disregarded 121 and denied as burdensome to the

settlement process.1 22 After the parties have reached a settlement
119. See id at 1353. The Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Mendoza reads as follows:
Whether the existence of this potential conflict requires a trial court to
reject a settlement proposal depends upon the circumstances of each case.
The presence of simultaneously negotiated attorneys' fees should cause the
court to examine with special scrutiny the benefits negotiated for the class.
It would rarely be an abuse of discretion for a trial court to reject a settlement proposal where such combined negotiation took place. But rejection
of a settlement is not automatically required in such cases-there may be
circumstances present which appear to neutralize the potential for
impropriety.
id
120. Once a settlement has been agreed to, and the plaintiff has prevailed, an
attorney can no longer even fall back on the pre-settlement delusion that proceeding
to trial would best serve the client's interests-and, not coincidentally, his own.
121. Chattanooga Branch of the NAACP v. Chattanooga, Nos. 82-5016/5031
(6th Cir. App. Dismissed Apr. 29, 1982), is an unreported case in which the plaintiffs'
motion to prohibit counsel from discussing attorneys' fees as part of the settlement
negotiations of the dispute between the parties was filed in the district court to prevent defense counsel from seeking an express waiver of fees during negotiations of the
claims. This was met by the defendants' refusal to continue settlement negotiations;
by directions from the court to resume negotiations in the best interests of the plaintiffs; and by the court's reluctance to formally rule on the substance of the motion.
See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4-7, Chattanooga Branch of the NAACP v. Chattanooga, Nos. 82-5016/5031 (6th Cir. App. Dismissed Apr. 29, 1982).
122. See Levin, supra note 16, at 519. In his article, Mr. Levin discussed Vega v.
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which expressly waives or is silent on the matter of fees, plaintiffs'
motions for trial courts to grant attorneys' fees and, if necessary, to set
aside the fee waiver provisions of newly or soon to be approved consent decrees have invariably been denied.1 23 Moreover, they have
been met with defendants' cross-motions to set aside the consent decree or, in the alternative, to deny the plaintiffs' motions for attorneys' fees. 124 Appeals from district court denials of these motions for
attorneys' fees are countered by the defendants' cross-appeals to vaBloomsburgh, 427 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1977), in which the Massachusetts District
Court refused to rule improper the defendants' insistance on a fee waiver, although
the parties had already agreed to a settlement which did not mention counsel fees.
See Levin, supra note 16, at 519. Plaintiffs' counsel, faced with the ethical dilemma of
having to waive their fees or contest the issue, acquiesced in the court's decision. Id.
Thus, as Mr. Levin suggests, this early portion of Vega clearly illustrates the Massachusetts court's refusal to follow the Prandini reasoning during the presettlement
phase negotiations. Id.
123. See, e.g., Aho, 608 F.2d at 366; Chattanooga Branch of the NAACP v. Chattanooga, Nos. 81-5016/5031 (6th Cir. App. Dismissed Apr. 29, 1982), Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9-10. For further discussion of Aho, see notes 104-05 and
accompanying text supra.
However, challenges to consent decrees by defendants are equally unproductive.
Since consent orders are usually construed as private contracts, when either party
attempts to set aside part of an order, the remainder of the other party's performance
is excused at least until the validity of the questioned terms is decided. See United
States v. ITT"Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236-38 (1975). In ITTConinhental, the Court observed that, "since consent decrees and orders have many of the
attributes of ordinary contracts, they should be construed basically as contracts. . . ." Id See also Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 450-51 (E.D. Ill. 1978).
124. See, e.g., White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Empl. Sec., 455 U.S. 445
(1982). In White, the petitioner brought a class action against the New Hampshire
Department of Employment Security (NHDES) claiming that the respondent failed
to make timely determinations of certain entitlements to unemployment compensation. Id. at 447. Petitioner's complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, but
did not specifically request attorney's fees. Id The district court found for the peti-

tioner but, pending an appeal by NHDES, the parties signed a settlement agreement.
Id. More than four months after the settlement was approved, the petitioner filed a
motion for attorney's fees under the Fees Act. Id at 448. The district judge granted
the motion on the grounds that the settlement agreement did not constitute a waiver
of petitioner's right to seek counsel fees. Id Immediately thereafter, respondent
moved to vacate the consent decree arguing that it had intended the agreement to fix
its total liability, and that it would not have agreed to the settlement had it thought
it could be subjected to further liability. Id The district court denied respondent's
motion, but the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed on other procedural
grounds. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case on
the procedural grounds. Id at 455. Thus, the issues which sparked the controversy in
the district court remain unresolved today.
See also Aho, 608 F.2d at 368 (defendants "moved to set aside the entire consent
agreement on the grounds that [plaintiffs] had acted in bad faith by concealing their
intention to seek attorneys' fees and had materially breached the terms of the agreement"); Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 448 (E.D. Ill. 1978)("Defendants responded [to plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees] with a motion of their own asking
this court to strike and deny plaintiffs' request . .. , or in the alternative that the
consent order be vacated.").

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29: p. 597

cate the consent decree.' 25 At each step to obtain review, the prevailing plaintiffs beneficial relief, although nearly attained after the
favorable settlement has been reached, is postponed and permanently
threatened by counsel's efforts to secure attorney's fees. Moreover,
each step forward reintroduces precisely the same ethical dilemma
that originally forced acceptance of the fee waiver. In the quest for
attorney's fees, plaintiffs counsel continues to place the client's recovery in jeopardy. Any collateral attack on a Fees Act attorney's fee
waiver replays this ethical dilemma and very often risks the loss of
126
arduously won, urgently needed, non-monetary relief.
E.

Conflicts of Interest

The barriers to appellate review in Fees Act waiver cases have
contributed to the courts' failure to appreciate and carefully distinguish between the diverse conflicts of interest presented by different
pre-trial simultaneous settlements. 127 There are as many different potential conflicts of interest involved as there are combinations of participants. For instance, a conflict of interest occurs when an attorney
simultaneously negotiates attorney's fees and a settlement of the
claims of uncertified and unnamed class members. 28 A second conflict of interest arises between counsel and a certified class when a
defendant offers excessive fees in return for a "sweetheart" settlement
on the merits. 29 Third, there is serious potential for a conflict of in125. See Aho, 608 F.2d at 366, 368. See also Chattanooga Branch of the NAACP
v. Chattanooga, Nos. 82-5016/5031 (6th Cir. App. Dismissed Apr. 29, 1982. According to counsel for plaintiffs-appellants, the cross-appeal of defendants, accompanied
by refusal to institute the relief approved in the consent decree, resulted in a decision
to withdraw the appeal.
126. Fees Act cases very often involve injunctive and declaratory relief. See note
7 supra.
127. For discussion of the sources of the ethical constraints on plaintiffs' and
defendants' attorneys in Fees Act attorneys' fees waivers, see notes 137-67 and accompanying text zhfra.
128. See, e.g., Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1315 (4th Cir. 1978) (addressing the potential conflict of interest, in a pre-certification settlement context,
between the compromise of a named plaintiff's individual claim, a claim for attorney's fees for plaintiff's counsel, and the claims of absent class members); Munoz v.
Arizona State Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670, 671-72 (D. Ariz. 1978) (dismissal of class action
allegations and refusal to accept an attorney's fees settlement in an employment discrimination case because attorney's fees were negotiated simultaneously with an overall settlement, creating a "clear conflict of interest"); Lyon v. Arizona, 80 F.R.D. 665,
669 (D. Ariz. 1978) (a different judge from that in Munoz granted a motion to dismiss
allegations and refused to accept an attorney's fees settlement because plaintiffs'
counsel had shown a direct conflict of interest in attempting to negotiate attorney's
fees simultaneously with negotiation for settlement of the claims of uncertified and
unnamed class members).
129. See, e.g., Mendoza, 623 F.2d at 1352 (plaintiff argued that simultaneous negotiations can result in tradeoffs between additional benefits to the class and attor-
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terest between attorney and client when the attorney is confronted
with a request to waive a Fees Act attorney's fee award. All three
conflict of interest problems can be, and have been, resolved through
the use of the Prandini dual negotiation method.130 Yet, courts have
been reluctant to employ this method. Notably, this failure to apply
the Prandni method is much more harmful in Fees Act waiver cases
than in excessive fee situations. The difference becomes evident when
the four general aims of awarding statutory attorney's fees are
examined.
Statutory attorney's fees have four broad goals. First, they stimulate legal representation through the availability of fee awards. Second, they facilitate the enforcement of rights through improved access
to legal representation. Third, they deter non-compliance by defendants and by potential violators. Fourth, they demonstrate a national
commitment to protect the class of persons who benefit through direct enforcement of the rights involved, and to protecting the public
3
in general, which benefits through voluntary compliance.1 '
When an overly generous fee offer is made by a defendant, the
courts' prime concern is to shield the individual named plaintiffs and
the remainder of the class from their attorney's self-interest in profiting from the terms of the settlement, through the receipt of a disproportionate share of the settlement as attorney's fees. In addition, the
courts are concerned that the attorney's self-interest will motivate
him to settle the lawsuit at a premature stage and/or to settle it on
terms detrimental to the named plaintiffs and/or the class.
Implicit in the courts' recognition of this need to protect plaintiffs and the interested class is the assumption that a single monetary
pot exists to be split between client and attorney. No doubt this is a
valid assumption in most commercial cases where monetary relief is
fundamental. However, this premise is of less value in many Fees Act
cases. In civil rights cases, monetary recovery often plays a
ney's fees where plaintiff's attorneys had negotiated fees of $500,000); Prandnht 557
F.2d at 1021 ("we must look at an agreement by defendants to pay counsel for the
class a fee up to a certain maximum, as determined by the court, as having the potentiality of what is known in the labor field as a 'sweetheart contract' ") (citing
Prandini v. National Tea Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 956, 957 (1976)).
130. For a discussion of the use of the dual negotiation method to resolve conflict of interest problems, see notes 103-04 supra.
131. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973). See also Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). In Newman, the Court observed that
"Congress . . . enacted the provision for counsel fees-not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know to be untenable but, more
broadly, to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial
relief...." Id. at 402. See generally Derfner, supra note 12. For a general discussion
of the goals of statutory attorney's fees, see notes 21-40 and accompanying text supra.
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subordinate role to injunctive and declaratory relief, and it is much
more difficult to convert these nonmonetary settlement offers into
precise dollar equivalents. Therefore, in any monetary "sweetheart"
settlement, the primary concern of the court, quite properly, is that a
client's recovery not be sacrificed to attorney's greed.
When excessive fee settlements are weighed against the purposes
of providing statutory fee awards, they seriously threaten only the
goal of assuring an adequate and fair recovery to injured parties. At
worst, they have only a minimal negative impact on the other policy
aims of statutory fee-shifting, and at best, they actually serve these
purposes. Excessive fees stimulate and draw practitioners, who anxiously await clients. 32 Indeed, the extra incentive of pocketing disproportionate shares of settlements may even draw aggressive, skilled
counsel, capable of maximizing overall settlements. 3 3 Consequently,
the use of excessive fee settlements does not significantly reduce the
deterrent effect of the Fees Act on defendants and potential violators,
since it is the overall monetary level of a settlement which deters, not
34
its apportionment between attorney and client.1
Excessive fee settlements are largely problems of misallocation
between attorney and client. As such, they can usually be controlled
by two time-consuming alternatives to the bifurcated settlement. The
first is a case-by-case monitoring of the reasonableness of attorney's
fees settlements. 35 The second is a search for an adversarial interest
in each case so that settlement does not take place in an ex parte
132. See, e.g., Dam, supra note 13, at 58-59 (noting that court awards of attorney's fees in commercial class action cases have been substantial and have been criticized as a source of abuse). See generally Developments in the Law--Class Actions, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1604-23 (1976) ("Critics of class actions have suggested that a
pattern of 'miniscule recoveries' and 'a golden harvest of fees' is characteristic at least
of damages class actions.").
133. See Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Action and DerivativeSuits, 1978 J.
CORP. L. 267, 331 n.458 ("Obviously, handsome awards encourage attorneys to take
class actions and meager awards discourage the bringing of such actions.").
134. See notes 208-11 infra.
135. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring judicial approval of all class action
settlements). See also Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 828 (1982) (the court extensively reviewed and approved a simultaneous settlement in an employment discrimination class action); Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd,
68 F.R.D. 479, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Injamison, the court set aside a proposed settlement in a class action brought under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, partially because of a settlement provision for direct payment of attorney's fees to
counsel for the class. The court ruled that the issue of settlement of attorneys' fees
was "more properly reserved for judicial consideration after the settlement of the
gross amount to the class . . . [because] the present arrangement leaves the unfortunate impression that defendants are buying themselves out of a lawsuit by direct
compensation to plaintiffs' counsel." Id. For further discussion of Parker,see note 218
nfa. For additional examples of cases where the court monitored attorneys' fees, see
notes 200, 204-05 & 216 and accompanying text tfra.
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When full or partial Fees Act waiver settlements are compared
with the purposes of statutory fee awards, they present very different
problems from those which result in excessive fee situations. In Fees
Act waiver settlements, the courts know that settlement terms lack
reasonable compensation for attorneys. Non-allocation, not misallocation, is the issue. The danger to named plaintiffs and to the class
comes from an attorney who might be tempted, by self-interest in
fees, to continue a lawsuit beyond the optimal settlement point on the
merits. Thus, only the unscrupulous attorney who presses forward,
sacrificing the client's interest, poses a realistic threat to a civil rights
plaintiff. Client interest, ethical constraints, defendant pressure, and
court supervision make this rare.
Therefore the injury in fee waivers is almost never to the named
plaintiffs and/or the class who receive an adequate recovery (or an
excessive one if the common fund analogy is valid). The damage is to
the truly unrepresented class, who are unable to obtain legal representation to bring civil rights claims in the future. The harm is to the
general public as well, which suffers not only from lax enforcement of
the civil rights laws, but also from the diminishing of the deterrent
impact of attorney's fees by the perception that the cost of noncompliance has been freed from the burden of Fees Act Awards. A Fees Act
attorney's fee waiver shortchanges the public as much as it harms the
attorney who foregoes the award.
As a result, a number of courts have recognized the importance
of separate settlements of the merits and attorney's fees where potential conflicts of interest arise in "sweetheart" settlements. A close
analysis of the potential conflicts of interest in full and partial fee
waiver settlements, and the resultant harm to the congressional policies embodied in the Fees Act, dictate that separate settlements are
even more necessary in these circumstances.
136. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980) (defendant Boeing contended, but the Supreme Court did not decide, that the unclaimed portion of a class
fund from which the attorney's fees were to be drawn should revert back to the defendant); Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 150 (3d Cir. 1978) (a shareholders derivative suit where the adversarial interest needed to assure that a conflict between
attorney and class did not arise was supplied by the presence of the corporation as a
real party in interest, which, as the recipient of the fund created by the settlement,
would benefit to the extent that the settlement fund was not reduced by an award of
excessive attorney's fees). See also notes 216-17 and accompanying text itfra.
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SOURCES OF ETHICAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:

THE

ABA

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

The source of attorneys' ethical constraints in simultaneous Fees
Act negotiations and settlements is the fountainhead of legal ethicsthe American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of ProfessionalRespon-

sibihity (the Code).' 37 Although the Code was posed merely as a
source of ethical guidelines, through the impact of disciplinary proceedings,138 the threat of disqualification for conflicts of interest, 139
and the potential of malpractice actions for breach of its limita137. The MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980), adopted by
the ABA in 1969, retained the original thirty-two Canons of Professional Ethics first
adopted by the ABA in 1908. As early as 1972 it had been adopted by court rule or
unified bar resolution by almost every state. See 97 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 1972 at 268-72 (1975). See generally Developments in the Law- Confiicts of
Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244 (1981).
On August 2, 1983, the American Bar Association adopted a comprehensive new
Model Code of Professional Conduct. Although it should eventually replace the
Code of Professional Responsibility on the state level, the disagreement and heavy
opposition which have carried over from the dispute over ABA approval make the
likelihood of rapid adoption by the states highly unlikely. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 3,
1983, at Al, col. 1. There is clearly widespread opposition. See also N.Y.L.J., Aug. 9,
1983 at 1, col. 2. ("No dramatic changes in the rules for disciplining lawyers in New
York loom on the immediate horizon as a result of the American Bar Association's
vote last week to adopt a comprehensive new model code of ethics."); N.Y. Times,
Aug. 3, 1983, at B9, col. 2 ("Representatives of the two largest state bar associations,
those in New York and California, said here today that they would oppose adoption
of the model rules in their states, as did representatives of some other large state bar
associations, including those of Florida and Illinois."); L.A. Daily J., Aug. 3, 1983, at
15, col. 4 ("[T]here was wide agreement that getting the model code adopted in its
current form presents another mammoth task."); Chi. Daily L. Bull., Aug. 2, 1983, at
16, col. 5 ("The Illinois Supreme Court adopted its current ethics rules in 1980 and
Connelly said he doesn't expect the court to be in a hurry to adopt the new ABA
version.").
For analysis of the new model rules, see Freedman, Are the Model Rules Unconsitutional?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685 (1981); Kaufman, A CriticalFirst Look at the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J. 1074 (1980); Kutak, The Next Step in Legal
Ethics- Some Observations About the ProposedModel Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 30 CATH.
U.L. REV. 1 (1980); Patterson, The Function of a Code of Legal Ethics, 34 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 695 (1981). Compare Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules, 59 TEX.
L. REV. 639 (1981), with Frankel, Why Does Professor Abel Work at a Useless Task?, 59
TEX. L. REV. 723 (1981).
138. For a discussion of the use of the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility opinions as sources of law in state disciplinary proceedings, see Finman & Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating
Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee of Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67, 85 (198 1). See also S. TISHER, L. BERNABEI & M.
GREEN, BRINGING THE BAR TO JUSTICE 97 (1977) (cumulatively, only 0.6% of complaints of attorney ethical violations led to public sanctions in Pennsylvania and 1.7%
led to court imposed discipline in New York State); AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

REPORT ON THE GRIEVANCES SYSTEM 47 (1976).

See generally Developments-Conflicts

of Interest, supra note 137, at 1496-503 (the legal profession has come under continual,
sometimes withering, attack for failing to discipline its members).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss3/1

30

Kraus: Ethical and Legal Concerns in Compelling the Waiver of Attorney's

1983-84]

CONDITIONAL FEE WAIVERS

tions,1 40 it has become a set of authoritative legal restrictions on the
behavior of members of the profession. In support of this develop41
ment, the ABA promulgates the Code's Disciplinary Rules (DR's) 1
and Ethical Considerations (EC's). 142 The Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, in turn, interprets these in response to specific inquiries by attorneys uncertain as to how to conform their conduct to Code dictates.1 43 Additionally, committees of
state, local and speciality bar associations issue numerous ethics opinions, usually in response to specific inquires.' 44 Some of these have
145
been collected and are widely available.
Even without sanctions, it is to be expected that all practitioners
would conduct themselves ethically and avoid conflicts of interest
under the Code, its interpretive guidelines, and state and local rules.
In addition, experience has shown that these standards have the
greatest impact upon the behavior of civil rights and legal services
attorneys who must be even more circumspect in their actions than
139. See Finman & Schneyer, supra note 138, at 85 n.71; Developments- Conflicts of
Interest, supra note 137, at 1471-86.
140. The Code does not specifically undertake to impose standards for civil liability. This is left to general legal principles. However, once the standards are
adopted by the states, they become the basis for liability on the grounds of misconduct or malpractice. See Finman & Schneyer, supra note 138, at 86 n.72. See also
Developments- Confhcts of Interest, supra note 137, at 1487, where the author notes: "Although conflicts of interest account for only a small percentage of malpractice claims,
the private civil action is well established at least for the most serious violations, and
the use of such actions may be expected to grow as malpractice actions become more
popular."
141. The Code's Disciplinary Rules are mandatory in character and "state the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble

and Preliminary Statement (1980).
142. The Code's Ethical Considerations are not intended as a basis for disci-

pline, but are "aspirational in character," and are designed as general guides to ethical behavior and as aids in interpreting the Disciplinary Rules. Id.
143. The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
receives approximately fifty requests for new opinions annually. See Finman &
Schneyer, supra note 138, at 75. Despite these interpretations, the rules have been
criticized for their lack of specificity. See, e.g., Comment, ABA Code of ProfessionalResponsibihty. Voidfor Vagueness?, 57 N.C.L. REV. 671 (1979) (discussing application of
the Supreme Court's "void-for-vagueness" standard to the Code of Professional
Responsibility).
144. See DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS (0. Maru & R.
Clough eds. 1970); DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS (0. Maru ed.
Supp. 1970 & 1975). See also ABA DIRECTORY OF BAR ACTIVITIES 14 (1980) (a
recent survey found that 80% of all statewide and 23% of all local bar associations
issue opinions).
145. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW
YORK COuNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION & NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
OPINIONS: COMMITTEES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1980).
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other sectors of the legal profession. 146 A cursory review of recent history reveals that civil rights, legal services and public interest attorneys have been closely scrutinized, often by their hostile brethren,
and that deliberate attempts to thwart their activities have taken the
47
guise of disciplinary and ethical proceedings. 1
The majority of civil rights plaintiffs have either no resources to
pay attorney's fees, or are not obligated to do so because they are
represented by a public interest organization that does not accept fees
as a matter of policy, or by a legal services office that is prohibited
from charging for services.' 48 Consequently, the specific civil rights
claimant's primary concern is in obtaining a favorable resolution of
the case. Assuring that his or her legal representative receives compensation is only a secondary concern and, realistically, encouraging
legal representation for others to litigate civil rights claims may not
even be a concern of the individual claimant. Therefore, it is axiomatic that the interest in attorney's fees is that of counsel, not client.149 Certainly this is true in the case where the plaintiff is indigent
and has acquired legal representation with the expectation that suc146. For a discussion of the ethical difficulties confronting the legal services program, see In re Community Action for Legal Servs., Inc., 26 A.D.2d 354, 274
N.Y.S.2d 779 (1966) (rejecting a petition for approval of a legal services program
because of ethical concerns over solicitation, group representation and lobbying); Hiestand, The Pohtics of Poverty Law, 1n WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME 160 (B. Wasserstein &
M. Green eds. 1970); Robb, ControversialCases and the Legal Services Program, 56 A.B.A.

J. 329 (1970).
147. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371
ginia statute prohibiting the "solicitation"
zation not a party to a judicial proceeding
in it, which the Virginia courts construed

U.S. 415, 423 (1963) (challenge to a Virof legal business by any person or organiand having no pecuniary right or liability
to prevent the NAACP from prosecuting

racial discrimination suits); Murphy, The South Counterattacks. The Anti-NAACP Laws,

12 W. POL. Q. 371 (1959) (discussing the impact of the "anti-NAACP laws" on the
organization's ability to offer free legal services to persons bringing racial discrimination suits). For a brief discussion of the attacks on the National Lawyers Committee
by the New Deal legal establishment, see G. WOLFSKILL, REVOLT OF THE CONSERVATIVES (1962). For a compelling historical critique of the ABA's general institutional
bias against the lower strata of the legal profession and its lack of evenhandedness in
the creation and application of the Code, see generally J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976).
148. See note 5 supra and note 170 infra and accompanying text.
149. See Optnion No. 80-94 of the Committee on Professionalandjudicial Ethics of the
New York City Bar Association, 36 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 507, 508 (1981) ("Defense
counsel thus are in a uniquely favorable position when they condition settlement on
the waiver of the statutory fee: they make a demand for a benefit which the plaintiff's lawyer cannot resist as a matter of ethics and which the plaintiff will not resist
due to lack of interest.").
The general practice of the federal courts is to order that statutorily authorized

fees be paid directly to attorneys, rather than to clients. See, e.g., Maher v. Gagne,
448 U.S. 122, 126 (1980) (awarded to "respondent's counsel"); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 693 (1978) (paid "counsel for the prevailing parties"); Miller v. Amusement
Enters., 426 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1970) ("the fees allowed are to reimburse and
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cess will be accompanied by a satisfactory Fees Act award. Yet, these
circumstances enhance the ethical conflict for civil rights counsel,
since there is very often no alternate source of compensation other
than the anticipated Fees Act award.
The attorney's relationship to the client is that of a fiduciary who
must act in the best interest of the client. 150 The Code cautions the
attorney against sacrificing the undivided loyalty owed clients to "financial, business, property, or personal interests.' ' IS1 The attorney
continues to occupy the fiduciary position from the time he accepts
the case until the case is resolved. If a settlement is involved, the
attorney is required to negotiate, evaluate and communicate a proposal free from any taint of self-interest in gaining a fee. 15 2 Thus, in
civil rights cases, once relief is offered, the attorney is ethically and
legally obligated to advise his client of the substance and sufficiency
of that relief, of the burden, expense and risk of nonacceptance, and
of the likelihood of attaining an even more favorable outcome by con53
tinuing the lawsuit.1
Just as the Code plainly enumerates the bases for loyalty owed
compensate for legal services rendered and will not go to the litigants, named or
class.").
150. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1980) ("A
Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client").
See, e.g., Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 172, 369 P.2d 933, 936 (1962) ("[A lawyer's]
fiduciary duty is of the highest order and he must not represent interests adverse to
those of the client. . . . [H]e must adhere to a high standard of honesty, integrity
and good faith in dealing with his client.").
151. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (1980) ("a
lawyer shall not accept employment" if his own interests will interfere with his professional judgment).
152. Id Canon 5. Although the thrust of Canon 5 goes to economic, political
and social pressure from third parties which might influence attorney independence,
EC 5-1 provides as follows: "The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of
compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of
other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty
to his client." (footnote omitted). Id EC 5-1. See also id. EC 7-7 ("[I]t is for the client
...).
to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer.
153. Of course, civil rights attorneys often face other conflicts with clients besides those posed by simultaneous settlements. A common area of conflict concerns
the attorney's priority in establishing a law reform precedent or gaining broad remedial relief which may run counter to the client's interest in accepting a substantial
monetary settlement, offered, perhaps, at the precise point when the case appears
certain of success. For an argument that the fiduciary model of attorney loyalty
should be altered in this context to take account of the broader interests of the public
in final judicial resolution of the issue, see Developments- Conflits of Interest, supra note
137, at 1461-64. See also Bell, Serving Two Masters.- Integration Ideals and ClientInterests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (discussing attorney-client con-

flict in school desegregation cases in which attorneys argued for complete integration
and clients stressed better education).
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plaintiffs (and thereby dictates the only ethical choice of counsel
when confronted with Fees Act conditional settlements), it also
clearly delineates sources of ethical constraints on defense counsel,
who proffer conditioned settlement offers. For example, all lawyers
are required to assist in improving the legal system and to appreciate
that the "fair administration of justice requires the availability of
competent lawyers." 1 54 The actions of counsel in pressing coercive fee
waivers ultimately will create a vacuum in the availability of legal
representation in civil rights cases. The legal profession has continually recognized the need for legal representation of the indigent and
the duty of all attorneys to support such efforts.1 55 The Code calls on
members of the profession "to assist in making legal services fully
available."' 56 Moreover, the public's need for legal services is satisfied only if its members "are able to obtain the services of acceptable
57
legal counsel."1
In thwarting the purpose of the Fees Act and thereby limiting
indigent civil rights litigants' access to competent counsel, defense attorneys subvert the Code's objective of providing necessary legal services to those unable to purchase them 158 and frustrate the Code's
154. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-3 (1980). See also
[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial
id. DR 1-102(A)(5) ("A lawyer shall not ....
to the administration of justice."); id. EC 1-1 ("A basic tenet of the professional responsibility of lawyers is that every person in our society should have ready access to
the independent professional services of a lawyer of integrity and competence.").
155. Lawyers have been fond of proposing idealistic standards for the profession. Paragraph eight of a suggested oath for attorneys reads in part: "I will do all
that I can to assure that the client with the unpopular cause is properly represented,
and that the lawyer representing such a client receives credit from and support of the
bar for handling such a matter." Thode, The EthicalStandardfor the Advocate, 39 TEX.
L. REV. 575, 592 (1961). In addition, the ABA has consistently lauded the goal of
service to those financially unable to obtain legal representation, especially to enforce
equal rights. The ABA's Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, chaired by
Lon L. Fuller and John D. Randall, states:
If there is any fundamental proposition of government on which all would
agree, it is that one of the highest goals of society must be to achieve and
maintain equality before the law. Yet this ideal remains an empty form of
words unless the legal profession is ready to provide adequate representation for those unable to pay the usual fees.
Professional Responsibility. Report of theJoint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216 (1958).
156. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-1 (1980).
157. Id.
158. See id. EC 2-16. The Code provides as follows:
The legal profession cannot remain a viable force in fulfilling its role in
our society unless its members receive adequate compensation for services
rendered, and reasonable fees should be charged in appropriate cases to
clients able to pay them. Nevertheless, persons unable to pay all or a portion of a reasonable fee should be able to obtain necessary legal services,
and lawyers should support and participate in ethical activities designed to
achieve that objective.
Id (footnotes omitted).
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directive that counsel support efforts to meet the need for legal services. 159 In response, the New York City Bar Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics recently concluded that it is unethical for
defense counsel to demand conditional fee waivers in civil rights
cases.
[T]he long term effect of persistent demands for the
waiver of statutory fees is to prejudice a vital aspect of the
administration of justice and undermine efforts to make
counsel available to those who cannot afford it, contrary to
the obligations and aspirations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We find this conclusion particularly compelling in light of the special obligations of government
counsel, who in the usual civil rights case are counsel for
defendant, to deal fairly and not take undue advantage of
his [sic] position to bring about unjust settlements or
results. 160
While the ethical dilemma confronted by plaintiffs' attorneys in
civil rights simultaneous negotiation cases is clear under the Code,
defense counsel can argue that the Code embodies some countervailing values which mitigate the impact of these ethical constraints
upon defense attorneys' use of the coercive fee waiver. The duties of
loyalty to clients and of representing clients zealously within the
bounds of the law 161 both sanction a broad range of litigation strategy. 16 2 However, the Code also contains compelling admonitions
159. See id EC 2-25. "The rendition of free legal services to those unable to pay
reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer. . . . Every lawyer
should support all proper efforts to meet this need for legal services." Id (footnotes
omitted).
160. Opinion No. 80-94, supra note 149, at 510. The opinion relied strongly on
DR I-102(A)(5) and EC 2-25. For the relevant text of DR I-102(A)(5) and EC 2-25,
see notes 154 & 159 supra. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-14 (1980) ("A government lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceeding
has the responsibility to seek justice and to develop a full and fair record, and he
should not use his position or the economic power of the government to harass parties
or to bring about unjust settlements or results.").
161. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1980)
("The duty of lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same: to
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law."); Thode, supra note 155,
at 584 ("The advocate does not decide what is just in this case-he would be usurping
the function of the judge and jury-he acts for and seeks for his client that which he
is entitled to under the law. He can do no less and properly represent the client.")
(emphasis in original). See also notes 138-40 and accompanying text supra.
162. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (1980) ("The
advocate may urge any permissible construction of the law favorable to his client,
without regard to his professional opinion as to the likelihood that the construction
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which temper, and render secondary, its support of full and unbridled
representation of clients. The Code places a number of constraints on
defense counsel who insist on retaining every weapon in negotiating
civil rights case settlements. First, the Code's initial objective is to
63
curb actions which are prejudicial to the administration of justice.1
Certainly defendants, especially governmental entities, share with
their attorneys the interest in providing equal access to the courts and
in the fair administration of justice. Second, portions of the Code
raise fairness, and the appearance of fairness, above the interests of
lawyers and clients in vehement representation. 164 Third, although it
would speed settlement, the Code bars defense counsel from restricting access to legal representation by conditioning settlements on an
agreement by the plaintiffs attorneys not to represent future claimants against the same defendant. 65 Just as it is to a defendant's financial advantage to compel a fee waiver, it would also be to a
defendant's financial benefit to restrict opposing counsel - already
versed in the intricacies of a lawsuit, and about to extract a favorable
settlement - from pursuing similar cases. However, it is not enough
that both exchanges are financially advantageous, effectuate settlement of a lawsuit, and are the result of vigorous representation by
counsel. Both are unethical because they violate the same public policy of assuring that the supply of competent legal representatives,
with specialized knowledge and skills, is not curtailed through the settlement process. Fourth, the Code does not hesitate to declare unethical other practices which, if left unimpaired, would provide
defendants with additional ammunition to speed the settlement process. 166 Fifth, any reading of the Code's endorsement of aggressive
will ultimately prevail.") (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the defense attor-

ney's duty of loyalty owed to his client, see M.

FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 35 (1975) (emphasizing extreme loyalty); Frankel, The Searchfor

Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
over pure advocacy).

REV.

1031 (1975) (stressing the goal of truth

163. See DR I-102(A)(5), supra note 154.
164. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1980)

("The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate against his
concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal
process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm."). See also notes 192-95 and
accompanying text tnhfa.

165. Id DR 2-108(B) ("In connection with the settlement of a controversy or
suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement that restricts his right to practice

law.").
166. See id DR 7-102(A)(1)-(8). For example, the Code prohibits an attorney
from "conceal[ing] or knowingly fail[ing] to disclose that which he is required by law
to reveal." Id DR 7-102(A)(3). See also id DR 7-105 (forbidding the lawyer from
"present[ing], participat[ing] in presenting or threaten[ing] to present criminal
charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter"); DR 7-106(C)(7) (prohibiting a lawyer from "intentionally or habitually violat[ing] any established rule of pro-
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representation that permits conditional fee waivers directly contradicts the express congressional policy of providing counsel and access
to the judicial system in Fees Act cases. 167 Litigation maneuvers by
defense attorneys which coerce Fees Act waivers by capitalizing on
the conflicts of interest they raise for opponents subvert this public
policy and are therefore unethical.
IV.

IMPACT OF CONDITIONAL FEE SETTLEMENTS ON THE CIVIL
RIGHTS BAR AND ON CIVIL RIGHTS PRACTICE

A.

The Civil Rights Bar

The negative impact of conditional fee settlements on the civil
rights bar and on the availability of competent civil rights attorneys
requires only brief discussion. The entire federal policy of the Fees
Act is premised on the direct, positive correlation between the awarding of attorney's fees and the number of civil rights counsel. This
168
nexus was recognized throughout the Fees Act's legislative history
and has been acknowledged numerous times in subsequent court
69
decisions. 1
While the inverse relationship between fee waivers and the
number of civil rights counsel is evident, the fragile nature of the civil
rights bar is less apparent. Besides the few well-known subsidized legal organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, the federal legal services program, and public interest firms specializing in environmental
law, there are very few practitioners of civil rights law. 170
cedure or of evidence"); DR 7-107 (limiting the making of extrajudicial statements in
criminal matters, professional disciplinary proceedings, and juvenile disciplinary proceedings); DR 7-109 (proscribing the suppression of evidence and witnesses); EC 7-23
(recommending that the attorney inform the judge of legal authority directly adverse
to position of his client should adversary have failed to do so); EC 7-27 (instructing
that "[b]ecause it interferes with the proper administration ofjustice, a lawyer should
not suppress evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or
produce").
167. For a discussion of the Congressional intent behind the Fees Act, see notes
33-62 and accompanying text supra.
168. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Fees Act see notes 33-40 and
accompanying text supra.
169. See, e.g., Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824, 829 (3d Cir.), cert. dented, 103 S. Ct.
300 (1982). For a discussion of the courts' recognition of the correlation between Fees
Act awards and the number of civil rights counsel, see note 190 and accompanying
text supra.
170. See Handler, Ginsberg & Snow, The Pubhc Interest Law Industry, in PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 42, 55-67 (B. Weis-

brod ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Handler]. The authors' studies estimate that less
than 1%of the work of lawyers in private practice is involved in public interest law
activity. Id at 67. For a study of the distinctive style of practice of the ACLU and
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Various studies have supported the conclusion that private civil
rights practitioners are few in number. One study estimated that
only 600 lawyers, about .0015% of all lawyers in America, were engaged in public interest practice.1 7 1 A 1979 study, which included
personal interviews with 777 Chicago lawyers, selected at random to
provide a cross section of the bar, concluded that only forty-three
practiced civil rights law and that only one percent of the total legal
efforts of those interviewed were devoted to civil rights law.1 72 Additionally, the authors of the 1979 study emphasized that lawyers have
an extremely high degree of specialization and exclusive practice in
the areas of their expertise which is molded to a large extent by the
type of clients they serve. 173 Generalizing from these conclusions, it
appears that private civil rights practitioners are few in number, that
civil rights cases form only part of their work load, and that there is
unlikely to be much cross-pollination between lawyers in different
specialities.
An evaluation of the connection between attorney's fees and the
health of the civil rights bar must also take into account the beleaguered, federally funded legal services program. Fees Act awards are
extremely important to this program, which is already wincing under
President Reagan's concerted campaign 174 to reduce funding to local
offices, to eliminate their attendant back-up centers which provide
supportive services in civil rights cases, and to impose specific limita175
tions on the range of cases they can initiate.
the Legal Division and Education Fund, see Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change. Perspecit'ves on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976). It is noteworthy that the

public interest law reform cloak has also been taken up by conservative firms; at least
one of which-the Washington Legal Foundation-refuses, as a matter of policy, to
request attorney's fees awards. See Flaherty, Right- Wng Firms Pick Up Steam, Nat'l L.

J. May 23, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
For a general discussion of legal services practice, see Wexler, tactcing Law for
Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970); Note, NeighborhoodLaw OfTces.- The New Wave in
Legal Servicesfor the Poor, 80 HARV. L. REV. 805 (1967).

171. Trubek, Book Review, at 5 (reviewing
LAW, BALANCING THE SCALE OF JUSTICE:

COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST

FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN

(1976)) (unpublished manuscript). One authoritative work of public interest practice, although somewhat dated since its results are from 1975, found that the
72 public interest law firms it identified had positions for only 478 attorneys. See
Handler, supra note 170, at 51.
AMERICA

172. Laumann & Heinz, The Organizationof Lawyers' Work.- Stze, Intensity and CoPractice of the Fields of Law, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 217, 225.

173. Id at 243.
174. For President Reagan this appears to be round two. Round one was Governor Reagan's battles with California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc. (CRLA). See
Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 307 n.18. For a discussion of the entire incident see
Bennett & Reynoso, CaliforniaRural Legal Assistance (CRLA)." Survival of a Poverty Law
Practice, 1 CHICANO L. REV. 1 (1972).
175. See Poverty Law Today, Sum. 1981, at 1, col. 1. This list also includes:
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B.

Economic Impact

Even though the exact contours of the civil rights bar are unclear, its precarious financial plight is readily apparent. Even when
attorney's fees are awarded in civil rights cases, they do not approach
the large sums often granted in commercial antitrust and corporate
securities actions. 76 Moreover, the existence of a "public interest discount" has been well documented. 77 This results in disparate and
inequitable determinations of reasonable attorney's fees in commercial and civil rights cases.' 78 This occurs despite the specific require(1) a ban on class action lawsuits against government entities; (2) a ban on litigation
designed to promote, defend or protect homosexuality; (3) a ban on advice in desegregation matters; (4) a requirement of negotiation before litigation; and (5) a requirement that attorney's fees be returned to the National Legal Services Corporation. Id.
"[T]here is only $241 million per year available to provide civil legal services$80 million less than in 1980-81 and $241 million more than President Reagan
wanted." Pollack, Lawyers for the Poor, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1983, at A27, col. 1.
It is unlikely that the organized bar will fill this gap in legal services. Unfortunately, history and available studies indicate that the organized bar's pretentions to
pro bono work must be taken with a grain of salt. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 170, at
228 (the "sporadic involvement [in pro bono work of the traditional private practitioner] constitutes at most a de minimis contribution to law reform activity."); Handler, supra note 170, at 67 ("Little of the pro bono work done is of the Public Interest
Law type. Lawyers responding .. .were asked to indicate the types of clients for
whom they did pro bono work. . .. On average, 88 percent of all responses included
either individuals or traditional community organizations, such as churches, clubs,
universities, and unions, as clients during their billable hours devoted to pro bono
work."). Pleas by former ABA President Chesterfield Smith and others for insertion
of a mandatory pro bono requirement in the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct have been soundly defeated. See, e.g., Aronson, Attorney-Client Fee Arrangements: Regulation andReview, 68 A.B.A. J. 284, 287 (1982); Smith, A Mandatoly Pro Bono
Servzce Standard-Its Time Has Come, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 727, 728 (1981).

176. For a discussion of civil rights fee awards compared to commercial actions,
see Berger, supra note 8, at 310-15.
177. See id "Public interest discount" represents the idea that fee awards in civil
rights, environmental, consumer, and information access cases should be lower because attorneys have a professional responsibility to represent such clients and the
public. Id at 311.
178. See id.
at 311. "A general review of the reported decisions inescapably confirms the conclusion that statutory fee awards under civil rights, environmental, consumer, and government information access statutes have been substantially lower
than awards under antitrust, securities, and other fee statutes involving commercial
rights." Id at 310-11. "While the mean hourly rate awarded by courts under the fee
provisions of the private antitrust statutes was $181 in the cases surveyed, the mean
hourly rate awarded in the Title VII (employment discrimination) cases surveyed
was $40." Id.at 310 (citing Helfman, A Statistical Survey of One Hundred and
Forty Recent District Court Cases Involving Attorneys' Fees (1975) (project submitted to the faculty of Antioch School of Law)). This discrepancy was mentioned in
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732, 738 (D.R.I. 1979), afd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980). The court stated, "Unfortunately, there does
exist a wide discrepancy between fee awards in private antitrust cases (rates averaging $180 an hour) as against those in the area of civil rights (rates averaging $40 an
hour)." Id.
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ment in the Fees Act's legislative history that reasonable attorney's
fees in civil rights cases be set by the same standards that apply in
other cases. 179 Compliance and enforcement of civil rights laws require not only the availability of attorney's fees but also the maintenance of ample fees.
The policy of promoting compliance and enforcement of civil
rights legislation through the award of attorney's fees has caused the
courts to consistently hold that legal services attorneys are eligible for
Fees Act awards on the same basis as their counterparts in private
practice.180 It has been argued, however, that legal services attorneys
are already "instinctively" motivated by their interest in civil rights
enforcement to bring civil rights cases, and do not need the additional
incentive supplied by potential fees awards. 8 t If a fee award is made,
some argue, the amount should be keyed to their minimal legal serv8 2
ices salary, rather than the high rates charged by private attorneys. 1
Public officials have argued that since the government provides funding for legal services, a fees award against public officials would require the government to pay twice for the same services.18 3 To their
credit, the courts have rejected these arguments, and have also refused to inquire into the source of attorneys' motivation to represent
civil rights clients. 18 4 To do so would be anomalous, for to inquire as
179. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 2, at 6, reprintedi7z 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 5913 ("It is intended that the amount of fees awarded under [the Fees
Act] be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases and not be reduced because the rights
involved may be nonpecuniary in nature.").
180. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1938 n.4 (1983); New York
Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 70 n.9 (1980); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302,
1309 (9th Cir. 1980); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1248 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Hairston v. R & R Apts., 510 F.2d 1090, 1092-93 (7th Cir.
1975).
181. See, e.g., Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1305 (9th Cir. 1980). In DenniS,
Hawaii's Department of Social Services and Housing challenged attorneys' fees
awards arguing, ter alia, that the legal services agency that was involved in the suit
had "already voluntarily done what an award of attorneys' fees. . . was intended to
encourage, [so that] a further award under the Act would be unnecessary and would
not serve the purposes of the Act." Id
182. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1248 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. dened, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
183. See, e.g., Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
300 (1982); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1305-07 (9th Cir. 1980).
184. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1947 (1983) ("market standards should prevail"); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1309 (9th Cir. 1980) (fees
should not be less than those customarily paid private counsel in a civil rights case);
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977) (reasonable fee awards should not
be reduced because of low salaries), cert. dented, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Becker v. Blum,
487 F. Supp. 873, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (rejecting any reduction in the fees award to
reflect state and federal contributions to legal services and to reflect the law hourly
pay rates). But see EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638 of Va., 542 F.2d
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to specific motivation would only result in penalizing attorneys in inverse proportion to their commitment to civil rights. Lower fee
awards would be made to the most highly motivated, often members
of those few firms dedicated to civil rights litigation on a full-time
basis.
A number of recent articles have offered theoretical analyses and
economic models to describe and explain individual attorney motivation and resource allocation in response to monetary incentives. 185
Not surprisingly, lawyers dance to the beat of the marketplace. One
proffered model, even when discounted for factors high on the priority list of civil rights attorneys such as professional satisfaction, societal contribution and ethical considerations, concludes that "fee for
service lawyers" will withdraw resources from a given case when total
expected costs exceed total expected benefits. 186 No matter how sophisticated the analysis of attorney responses becomes, the conclusion
remains that the more we decrease the reasonable expectation of Fees
Act awards, the less likely it is that Fees Act cases will be initiated. 187
While the impairment to the availability of attorney's fees in
civil rights cases caused by conditional fee settlements does not approach their almost total abrogation by the decision in Al eska, that
experience provides an indication of the immediate hardship suffered
by civil rights claimants whenever there is a reduction in attorney's
fees awards. Personal horror stories of attorneys who lost face because
of Alyeska abound, 88 and Congress "received evidence that private
lawyers were refusing to take certain types of civil rights cases." 18 9
579 (2d Cir. 1976) (fees reduced to reflect funding to a legal services backup center),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977).
185. See, e.g., Johnson, Lawyers' Choice. A TheoreticalAppraisal of Litigatwn Investment Deci ons, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 567 (1980); Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of ClassAction Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (1976); Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A
Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methodsfor the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 55 (1982).
186. See Johnson, supra note 185, at 575.

187. In a highly theoretical analysis which posits lawful methods of allocating
legal costs and attorney's fees, the author found that in a system favoring the plaintiff
(where the plaintiff receives a fee award if successful but need pay defense costs if
unsuccessful), the plaintiff "will bring suit if and only if his expected judgment at
trial would be at least as large as his expected legal costs-his own legal costs discounted by the probability of losing." Shavell, supra note 185, at 60.
188. See, e.g., Hermann & Hoffman, Financing Public Interest Litgation in State
Court. A Proposalfor Legislative Action, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 173, 184-85 (1978). A

survey conducted by the Council for Public Interest Law found that Alyeska affected
pending claims held by 34 out of 44 responding private firms with a substantial public interest practice. Id.at 184 n.54 (citing the COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW,
BALANCING

THE

SCALES

AMERICA 315 (1976)).
189. H.R. REP. No.

OF

JUSTICE:

FINANCING

PUBLIC

INTEREST

LAW

IN

1558, supra note 5, at 3.
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Once attorney's fees are threatened, alternative sources of legal
representation for poor civil rights litigants, in both complicated and
mundane cases, become extremely limited. In the more mundane
civil rights cases, which often yield "modest cash awards," the Third
Circuit has recognized that " 'f/legal aid organizations are often the sole
representativesof the economicaly, socialy and culturaly deprived in their disputes with landlords,government welfare agencies, employers and creditors. ,"90
In addition, legal services offices are compelled to make choices between equally worthy cases based upon the likelihood of fees awards.
Although legal services attorneys are salaried and can theoretically
make unlimited investments in particular cases, the current level of
federal legal services program funding allows them to meet only approximately 20-25% of the need for such assistance.' 9' Consequently,
there is pressure to supplement budgets with attorney's fees awards,
especially if this enables an office to expand the number of civil rights
cases it can accept. If attorney's fees awards are threatened by the
settlement tactics of particular defendants, a legal services program
may divert energy from cases against these defendants which involve
important public issues, and expend disproportionate amounts of
time on cases where Fees Act awards are more likely. Therefore, not
only does conditional fee waiver practice reduce the supply of private
civil rights attorneys, but it also distorts the priorities of legal services
lawyers and constricts the channels of legal representation for the
poor.
V.

TACTICAL LITIGATION CONSIDERATIONS AND JUDICIAL
EFFICIENCY

A.

Adversarial Combat

A number of considerations are often advocated in favor of permitting simultaneous settlement. The most straightforward of these
stems from faith in the adversary system. It expounds a preference
for unfettered negotiation; a conviction that settlement is more likely
to occur at a preliminary stage in a lawsuit if all aspects of a case
remain negotiable and if each side has the maximum number of bar92
gaining chips to sacrifice.1
190. Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824, 830 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 300 (1982)
(emphasis supplied by court) (quoting Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1248 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978)).
191. See Johnson, supra note 185, at 592-93 ("After a 25 percent cutback in funding for the Legal Services Corporation, there is now only one Legal Services lawyer
available to help every 9,585 poor people eligible for assistance."). See also Pollack,
supra note 175.

192. See, e.g., White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl. Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 454
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The major difficulty with this view, besides its unnecessary glorification of the sporting theory of the law, is its implicit acceptance of
the traditional bipolar model of a lawsuit in the very setting that is its
antithesis. 9 3 Civil rights cases often seek comprehensive injunctive
relief and widespread reform. The private attorney general concept
has been statutorily recast in the Fees Act precisely because the outcomes of civil rights cases impart benefit beyond the immediate parties.' 94 An appeal to the adversarial process at the pre-trial stage to
justify a tactic which creates ethical conflicts between an attorney and
his or her client disregards the remedial process.
Furthermore, the truth-finding advantages rightfully ascribed to
the adversarial process during trial are not attained through unbridled negotiation at the pre-trial stage. Truth and accuracy are better
served by delaying vigorous representation in the setting of attorney's
fees until after settlement of the merits has been reached. At that
point, adversaries can focus entirely on the question of reasonable attorney's fees, freed from the potential ethical quandries presented by
conditional fee waivers whether it be in the negotiation of an attorney's fees settlement or in the court's review of applications for reasonable fees. ' 95
B.

FacilitatingSettlement andJudicial Economy

A related argument which has been offered in opposition to the
negotiation of attorney's fees only upon settlement of the merits is
that it is advantageous for defendants to know their full exposure to
financial loss as soon as possible in the settlement process.' 9 6 It is arn.15 (1982) ("a defendant may have good reason to demand to know his total liability from both damages and fees"); Aho v. Clark, 608 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1979)
(the court refused to allow discussion of attorney fees outside consent agreement
since that would "alter [the] consequences of that compromise").
193. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge i Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1281, 1282 (1976).
194. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 5, at 2. "If (the plaintiff) obtains an
injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a 'private attorney general,'
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest [priority]." Id (quoting
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
195. See Prandini,557 F.2d at 1021. The Third Circuit explained the advantages
of the bifurcated procedure:
The procedure ... preserves the benefits of the adversary system since the
defendant continues to have an economic interest. Moreover, the merits of
fee disputes become separated from those of damages, thus reducing the
conflict between client and attorney. This procedure would make the
court's task less burdensome and remove a source of uneasiness over the
settlement procedure without in any way impairing the power to set a
proper fee.
Id

196. It has been argued that the defendant will want to know the exact extent of
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gued that it is desirable to eliminate the unknown monetary variable
of a post-settlement attorney's fees award because it is more equitable
to defendants, and because it leads to more informed, and earlier,
decisions to settle. This, in turn, facilitates and effectuates the public
policy in favor of pre-trial settlement of civil rights claims, 19 7 and
thereby avoids the inefficient use of judicial resources to shepherd
cases further along the path to trial and to conduct repetitive hearings on settlements of the merits and attorney's fees.
These contentions are subject to criticism on a number of
grounds. As previously discussed, the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility' 98 and court decisions' 99 make it clear that defense attorneys may not use unethical tactics to promote settlements that rely on
conflicts of interest between opposing counsel and client. Courts
closely examine the ethical conduct of attorneys when reviewing the
reasonableness of agreements involving attorney's fees to see if they
comport with public policy. 200 Even the appearance of impropriety is
liability before agreeing to settle. In a class action context, this can mean (1) an
agreed fee, Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Tex. 1976), af'd,577
F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1978); (2) a separate fund for fees, Prandii,, 557 F.2d 1015; Women's Comm. for Equal Empl. Opportunity v. N.B.C., 76 F.R.D. 173 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); (3) a ceiling on the allowable fee, Grunin v. International House of Pancakes,
513 F.2d 114 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975); McNary v. American Sav.
and Loan Ass'n, 76 F.R.D. 644 (N.D. Tex. 1977); or (4) a total settlement fund from
which the trial court sets a fee, Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 63 (1982); Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir.
1975). For a general discussion supporting this rationale, see Note, Promotingthe Vindication of Civil Rights, supra note 16, at 362 ("fees are commonly settled as part of
negotiations in connection with other types of litigation without conflict-of-interest
problems"); Note, Conflicts Createdby the Simultaneous Negotiation and Settlement of Damages and Statutorily Authorized Attorneys' Fees in a Title VII Class Action-PRrandni v. Na-

tional Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977), 51 TEMP. L.Q. 799, 812-13 (1978)
("defendants are deprived of vital information they need to agree upon a settlement
in that they would not know during the initial class damage proceedings their total
liability").
197. Public policies in favor of pretrial settlement include the expedition of
claims, lessening of court backlog, mitigation of legal expenses, and voluntary cooperation between the parties. Courts have repeatedly noted the importance of the pretrial settlement process. See, e.g., Prandini, 557 F.2d at 1021 ("we recognize that with
the increasingly heavy burden upon the courts, settlements of disputes must be encouraged"); Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1209 (5th Cir.) ("our limited review
rule is a product of the strong judicial policy favoring the resolution of disputes
through settlement"), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 63 (1982). For a discussion of federal
court judges abusing their power by forcing settlements, see Resnik, ManagertalJudges,
96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
198. For a discussion of the pertinent sections of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, see notes 154-57 and accompanying text supra.
199. For a discussion of recent court decisions pertaining to the ethical dilemma
of simultaneous fee settlements, see notes 70-106 and accompanying text supra.
200. See, e.g., Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.) (contract between Commonwealth and legal services program which prohibited program from seeking attorneys'
fees from the Commonwealth was not enforceable because it was against public pol-
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a sufficient ethical ground to disqualify an attorney from representing
a client on the basis of conflict of interest. 20 1 A process which is justified in terms of promoting settlement, but operates to deny reasonable compensation to attorneys and fosters ethical conflicts of interest,
is contrary to public policy and invites careful judicial scrutiny.
Arguments couched in terms of judicial efficiency overestimate
the number of cases in which settlement would be discouraged if a
simultaneous settlement were impermissible. 20 2 Only the closest cases
might be pushed beyond the settlement stage because the exact
amount of attorney's fees could not be ascertained before completion
of settlement of the merits. Any disincentive to early negotiation
caused by uncertainty over fees would still be greatly outweighed by
the unknown and substantial monetary risk of neglecting settlement.
For instance, in any case where the plaintiff is likely to prevail,
postponing settlement not only risks increased litigation expenses, additional legal fees, and a more injurious outcome on the merits than
was available through settlement, but it also risks a sharp escalation
of the Fees Act award. Indeed, a prevailing plaintiff is eligible for a
Fees Act award to cover legal work necessary to prepare for and to
conduct the trial, to appeal the decision on the merits, and to draft
petitions for and fully litigate all questions surrounding the availabil20 3
ity and amount of attorney's fees awards.
icy), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 300 (1982); Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 648 (lst Cir.
1978) ("if the court finds that an agreement provides for an unethically excessive fee,
it may sparingly exercise its supervisory powers over the bar to limit the amount the
attorney may actually receive") (footnote omitted); Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35,
39 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (attorney's fees contracts are "of special interest and concern to
the courts" and are "not to be enforced upon the same basis as ordinary commercial
contracts").
201. See, e.g., Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1093 (3d Cir.)
("no member of the bar either maintaining an employment relationship, including a
partnership or professional corporation, or sharing office or suite space with an attorney class representative during the preparation or pendency of a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action may serve as counsel to the class if the action might result in the creation of a
fund from which an attorneys' fee award would be appropriate"), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 830 (1976); Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 1976)
(firm disqualified since one attorney who formally represented plaintiff in related
matter was still a member of firm representing defendant, irrespective of whether any
confidential information was exchanged); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469
F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1972) ("a court may disqualify an attorney for not only
acting improperly but also for failing to avoid the appearance of impropriety") (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
202. There will be a trial if and only if the plaintiff's estimate of the expected
judgment exceeds the defendant's estimate by the sum of their legal costs. See
Shavell, supra note 185, at 67. For a discussion of the economics of bringing suit, see
notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
203. See, e.g., Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 54 (3d Cir. 1978) (on a
second appeal, solely to examine the proper standard to apply in setting the fee, the
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At the other end of the spectrum, where a defendant is confident
of success, settlement terms will most likely be dictated by the defendant: even if the plaintiff is subsequently found to have prevailed on
some issues, the amount of attorney's fees will be circumscribed by the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart,2 0 4 which held
that prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to Fees Acts awards only to the
degree that they succeed in obtaining the relief sought. 20 5
In only a few close cases will a defendant's cost-benefit settlement
analysis result in a decision not to settle the merits because of ignorance of a total settlement figure. To justify a general practice of
concurrent settlement by seizing on these few cases is to rely on the
very settlements that have the greatest potential for conflict and
harm, since in cases where the chance of failure is highest for both
sides, there is the strongest temptation to enter into a pact which excludes plaintiff's civil rights attorney. 20 6 Thus, while knowledge of
the total size of liability will no doubt make settlement more attractive to defendants in this narrow range of cases, these situations are
insufficient to provide the needed rationale for a general policy of
conditional fee settlement.
Moreover, it is unrealistic to assume that a defendant is completely in the dark as to the amount of attorney's fees for which a
plaintiff will ultimately settle or be awarded in a bifurcated system.
The same attorney who feels capable and confident when assessing
and recommending terms for a merit settlement is certainly also able,
except, perhaps, where a truly novel legal theory is being presented,
to forecast with relative precision the amount of opposing counsel's
time expenditure and likely fee award. In most cases there are
enough signals to enable any defense counsel who wishes to avoid a
harsh surprise to make an accurate projection of a Fees Act award.
court awarded costs incurred preparing and prosecuting fee applications); Hastings v.
Maine-Endwell Cent. School Dist., 676 F.2d 893, 896 (2d Cir. 1982) (fee awarded for
time spent pursuing interim appeals); Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell,
652 F.2d 1227, 1248 (5th Cir. 1981) (fees awarded for work done on appeals of the
merits).
204. 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
205. Id The result achieved is the crucial factor in adjusting fees on a performance scale that has gradations of "exceptional," "excellent," "partial," and "limited"
success. Id at 1940-41. Therefore, prevailing on only some issues will net a plaintiff a
very small award.
206. In close cases both sides will be eager to eliminate the large risk present in
going beyond the settlement stage. Still, there is no justification for providing a
windfall to plaintiffs at the expense of counsel. Even if we assume that particular
plaintiffs would receive smaller recoveries if conditional fee waivers are prohibited,
this is the price of enforcing the civil rights laws. The cost should be shared by successful plaintiffs, who receive legal representation, so that others, who are also unable
to afford counsel, will be able to secure representation.
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Helpful factors include the effort expended by the defense, which has
some equivalence to that of an opponent; past experience in similar
cases; and knowledge of the law and of its application by specific
judges in a particular jurisdiction.2 0 7 Moreover, once the Prandini
dual settlement procedure is established and uniformly applied, uncertainty as to the amount of attorney's fees would cause little difficulty in forestalling negotiation of settlements of the merits. As long
as civil rights attorneys consistently refused to permit the injection of
fees into preliminary settlement discussions, it would soon become the
norm for defense counsel to make estimates of fee awards and to use
these predictions in assessing merit settlements.
Furthermore, the deterrent factor which is negated by fee waivers will be furthered by separate settlements. 20 8 A Fees Act award
above and beyond relief on the merits, which is often nonpecuniary in
civil rights cases, acts as a necessary penalty for violation of the
law.20 9 If there is any doubt as to the effectiveness of Fees Act awards
207. This forecast is more difficult in cases which are especially complex or present novel legal theories. To determine the amount of fees in Fees Act cases, courts
usually apply the twelve factors listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). These factors are applied to increase or decrease the basic fee (the "loadstar" amount). Since the reactions of courts to contingency factors, such as the quality of attorneys' work and the novelty and difficulty of
questions presented, are not easily predicted, it is difficult to estimate opposing counsel's fees in cases involving these factors. For a discussion of the computation of attorney's fees, see LARSON, supra note 8, at 114-237. For an argument calling for more
widespread use of the contingency factor, see Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473 (1981).
208. A provision for fee awards serves to deter the violation giving rise to the
cause of action by increasing the defendant's exposure to liability. See Comment,
Attorney's Fees in Damage Actions Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976,
47 U. CHI. L. REV. 332, 347 (1980). The Supreme Court recognized and approved

the deterrent impact in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), when it noted that "the
potential liability of § 1983 defendants for attorney's fees . . . provides additional
assurance that agents of the State will not deliberately ignore due process rights." Id
at 257 n.l1.
209. This is a continuation of the longstanding policy, existing before the Fees
Act, of punishing defendants who have acted fraudulently or in a knowingly illegal
manner through the imposition of attorney's fees awards. See, e.g., Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1972) (a welfare case where attorney's fees were
awarded because some public officials disregarded court decisions and federal regulations); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963) (en banc) (it is an abuse
of equitable discretion not to award fees where there has been a continued pattern of
evasion and obstruction).
In discussing these policy considerations one commentator has suggested:
In other public benefit situations, such as injunctions with widespread
effect or the general deterrent effect on prospective defendants of encouraging plaintiffs with certain types of claims through reimbursement for their
fees if they win, the reasons for sparing losing defendants from fee shifting
are not so strong. True, much of the public benefit may come from effects
on complete strangers to the litigation; but it can be important to effective
deterrence to show by example that violators will bear the victims' enforce-
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in deterring forbidden conduct by public officials, it is dispelled by a
brief look at the dire warnings in literature written for government
administrators. For example, a recent journal article warns about
Fees Act cases: "Consistent with the intent of Congress, the federal
appellate courts have in effect declared 'open season' on the governmental pocketbook in such litigation when it comes to the awarding
of attorneys' fees."' 2 10 The author goes on to suggest that "there is an
obvious advantage to settle personnel grievances before a case is
filed."' 2 1' Plainly, Fees Act awards foster general compliance, reduce
civil rights infractions, and decrease the number of court cases filed.
An argument in favor of simultaneous settlement grounded in
court efficiency is misplaced because it overlooks the impact of the

element of deterrence. When the deterrence factor is accounted for,
simultaneous settlements may actually increase, not diminish, the
overall burden on courts. While combined settlements help satisfy
one aspect of the Fees Act policy by compensating those harmed by
violations of civil rights laws, they eviscerate a second by failing to
penalize violators, and thereby lower the general level of deterrence,
especially of public agencies. 2 12 Consequently, conditional fee settlements encourage civil rights abuses, at least to the extent that they
lessen deterrence; this may lead to an increase in the number of
claims brought to rectify violations. On the other hand, this effect
may be offset by the effect of fee waivers on the civil rights bar and
the curtailment of legal representation.
Regardless of which scenario is more accurate, both will be accompanied by de facto selective enforcement of the civil rights laws.
Permitting conditional fee settlements favors public entities 213 and
ment costs. Moreover, the defendants are members of the class of violators
and of those whose conduct deserves deterrence; economic sense dictates
placing the cost of enforcement at least on the sector whence came the
violations.
Rowe, supra note 10, at 673.
210. Spurrier, Payingthe Piperin FederalCivil Rights Litigation, 1983 PUB. ADMIN.
REV.

199, 260.

211. Id (emphasis in original).
212. "With respect to the awarding of fees to prevailing defendants, it should
further be noted that government officials are frequently the defendants in cases

brought under the statutes covered by [the Fees Act]." H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra
note 5, at 7. Since many legal aid societies are publicly supported, the government
has great leverage in requiring conditional fee settlements and, thereby, reducing the
deterrent effect of an award of attorney's fees.
213. In addition to large financial resources, public entities also have an advantage ascribed to the few public interest attorneys whose practice is subsidized: since
the cost of resistance for public officials and their counsel is totally subsidized, they
can make litigation decisions, especially long range ones, not available to more costconscious private defendants.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss3/1

48

Kraus: Ethical and Legal Concerns in Compelling the Waiver of Attorney's
1983-84]

CONDITIONAL FEE WAIVERS

other habitual abusers 21 4 who are customary defendants in civil rights
cases. They can better fend off subsequent claims and continue unlawful practices by the use of an intentional and concerted insistence
on fee waivers. The reputation of specific defendants who utilize fee
waiver tactics quickly spreads, and the civil rights bar is forced to
switch resources to other "targets. '21 5 Thus, the most flagrant offenders are rewarded.
Furthermore, courts are presently required to approve settlements in class actions. 21 6 The additional effort necessary to review
settlements in two steps is minimal. In fact, a persuasive case can be
made that overall judicial efficiency is enhanced by the use of bifurcated negotiation and review. The Prandrnimethod of separate negotiation preserves aggressive adversary representation so that both
settlements are free from ex parte taint, and are therefore likely to
fashion a result which more closely approximates the court's final determination after review.21 7 There is less need for expensive and
time-consuming discovery, evidentiary hearings, oral and written arguments, and lengthy, independent court review when separately negotiated fee settlements are presented for court approval. 218
214. See, e.g., Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead" Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc. REv. 95 (1974). The author discusses the strengths of
those who often litigate ("repeat players"), as compared to those who rarely have
contact with the courts ("one-shooters"). He notes the advantages of the former in
being able to develop long-term strategies and to make decisions in immediate cases
which have ramifications for their long range goals. Id.
215. This, of course, cuts both ways: a lawyer who accedes to such a demand
soon becomes a target for additional requests.
216. Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the
class in such manner as the court directs." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
217. See Prandini,557 F.2d at 1021. "This procedure may not be particularly
appealing to the parties, but it preserves the benefits of the adversary system since the
defendant continues to have an economic interest." Id. The danger of collusion between opposing counsel through informal preliminary discussions of, and, perhaps,
agreements to settle the fee and the withholding of this information from courts until
after merit settlements has been alluded to in Dam, supra note 13, at 57 n.19. While
this could make enforcement of separate negotiations more difficult in excessive fee
situations, it is no hindrance in fee waiver situations where plaintiff attorneys have
every reason to bring overtures to waive fees to the attention of the courts.
218. For an example of the extensive court review that is encouraged by simultaneous settlement, see Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 63 (1982). Parker involved the settlement of an employment discrimination
class action with a proposed lump-sum settlement of class claims and an agreement
that reasonable attorneys' fees would be paid from the total settlement fund. Id.at
1208. The amount of fees was left to the district court's determination. Id. A twoday hearing on the terms of the merit settlement and a third day receiving evidence
on the issue of fees for class attorneys were necessary before the court approved the
settlement. Id On review, the Fifth Circuit recognized the potential for abuse and
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Additionally, if conditional fee waivers were forbidden, the conflict of interest questions they raise would be rendered dormant and
courts would no longer expend time wrestling with this issue. The
frustration and outrage now felt by civil rights attorneys who are confronted with fee waiver demands, and the natural tendency of such
requests to raise the general level of acrimony and to hinder settlement negotiations, would be abated. Hence, a bifurcated system
might allow attorneys to operate more openly and reduce the need for
constant court supervision during settlement.
Also, as the Supreme Court noted in a related context in White v.
New Hampshire Department of Employment Securtt, 219 the pressure caused
by permitting concurrent settlements may actually generate increased
litigation of fee questions because civil rights counsel, anticipating an
ultimate fee waiver settlement, may rush to enter fee requests at every
220
favorable interim ruling in advance of settlement.
Finally, a recent study has demonstrated that federal district
court judges and attorneys who litigate class actions favor separate
determination of the merits and attorney's fees, and do not consider
the Prandini'methodburdensome. 22 1 Sixty-two percent of the seventyconflict of interest in combined settlements of class actions; nonetheless, the court
approved the settlement, over the objections of nine of the 11 named plaintiffs, because the district court had made a thorough and independent evaluation of the
adequacy of the class settlement, had set reasonable attorneys' fees, and had also
found that the named plaintiffs opposed the class settlement in bad faith, primarily
to gain leverage in the settlement of their individual claims. 'Id at 1211-14.
219. 455 U.S. 445, 453 (1982).
220. Id In White, the Supreme Court discussed the inapplicability of Rule 59(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires that "[a] motion to alter or
amend the judgment . . . be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment," to a request for attorney fees. Id at 446-47. The Court stated that "[i]f Rule
59(e) were applicable, counsel would forfeit their right to fees if they did not file a
request in conjunction with each 'final' order. Cautious to protect their own interests, lawyers predictably would respond by entering fee motions in conjunction with
nearly every interim ruling." d. at 453.
221. A. MILLER, supra note 17, at 223-24. Attorneys and judges were both asked
what they thought of the Prandin, solution. The question and results are as follows:
Settlements stipulating the size of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees create a potential for conflict between the attorneys' interest in a large fee and the class
interest in a large recovery. A Third Circuit holding suggests that plaintiffs'
attorneys should not discuss fees with defendants' attorneys until the class
settlement has been approved. Do you
Judges
Attorneys
strongly agree
15
(19.0%)
39
(40.6%)
agree
26
(32.9%)
24
(25.0%)
no opinion
8
(10.1%)
6
( 6.3%)
disagree
29
(30.4%)
15
(15.6%)
strongly disagree
6
(7.6%)
15
(12.5%)
79
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nine judges who responded to a questionnaire agreed or answered "no
opinion" when asked if they favored the Prandinirequirement that fees
222
not be discussed until after settlement of the merits in class actions.
Seventy-two percent of the ninety-six attorneys who responded also
'223
agreed or answered "no opinion.
In summary, simultaneous settlement finds insufficient support
in arguments which focus on defendants' need to know the exact extent of liability in proposed settlements, on its use as a means of fostering negotiation, and on its effect in improving court efficiency.
The simple fact remains that the consistent prospect of having to pay
Fees Act attorney's fees may serve as an inducement to settle a case
early, and therefore reduce the burden on the courts. 224 The risk and
uncertainty of not knowing the precise amount of liability is as likely
to promote early settlement as it is to make a defendant hesitant to
settle.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Fees Act relies on a direct, rather uncomplicated process to
assure that one of our most important national priorities is accomplished. Our basic civil rights are enforced by requiring those who
have abused the fundamental rights of others to furnish their victims
with the means to gain access to our judicial system and to acquire
the tools needed to obtain redress. In conjunction with compensation
for the injury, the wrongdoer provides the necessary inducement to
vindicate the wrong; in so doing, he discourages others from committing similar transgressions. The Fees Act attempts to neutralize the
factor of wealth in the fair administration of justice and to preserve
freedom of choice in securing expert legal representation to assist in
the enforcement of the civil rights laws.
Any interference with the availability of Fees Act awards-even
one that is merely perceived as a hindrance-must be closely examined by the courts. Demands for full or partial waiver of Fees Act
awards in return for favorable settlements of the merits seriously obstruct this essential safeguard.
After careful analysis, the alleged benefits of simultaneous settlements prove to be greatly exaggerated. Any advantages are clearly
outweighed by the havoc the practice brings to the settlement process.
222. Id.
223. Id
224. For a discussion of the deterrent effect of attorney's fees awards, see notes
208-11 and accompanying text supra.
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Defense counsel act unethically in offering such settlements and
plaintiffs' attorneys are tempted to act unethically in resisting them.
They breed discontent and foster conflict between attorney and client. They heighten bitterness between opposing counsel. They involve courts in the review of unjust and unethical settlement
agreements. This divide-and-conquer path to settlement has no place
in a scheme that was created to encourage the enforcement of civil
rights. It contravenes the purpose and objectives of the Fees Act and
immerses the legal profession in an unethical practice imbued with
the appearance of impropriety.
The best remedy for this harmful settlement procedure is that
2 25 Negotiation of attorney's fees in Fees Act cases
required by Prandinl.
must begin after the settlement of the merits has been determined.
This remedy has the advantages of being straightforward, effective,
and workable; eliminating the unethical conduct and potential conflicts of interest; preserving adversarial input during both phases of
the settlement process, thereby rendering compromises which provide
fair relief to plaintiffs and reasonable levels of attorneys' fees; and being self-policing by parties confronted with fee waiver requests. Finally, it is preferable both to time consuming, case-by-case court
dissections of simultaneous settlements and to other alternatives.
It is insufficient for courts to simply identify the potential conflicts of interest in simultaneous settlements. The tactic should be
prohibited and remedied by bifurcated settlement. The congressional
policy reflected in the Fees Act and the distinct ethical duties of the
legal profession, combined with the general supervisory power of the
courts, provide ample and explicit legal authority to restrict this intrusion on the administration of justice and to mandate a specific
remedy.
225. For a discussion of Plrandnt, see notes 70-79 and accompanying text supra.
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